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M.B.Z. v. Clinton
10-699
Ruling Below: Zivotojsky v. Sec'y o/State, 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009) cert. granted, 131 S.
Ct. 2897 (U.S. 2011).
'

In 2002, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Section 214(d) of the FRAA
directs the Secretary of State to record the place of birth of any U. S. citizen born in Jerusalem as
Israel, should that citizen request. Petitioner Menachem Zivotofskywas born in Jerusalem to
parents who are U.S. citizens. Menachem's parents requested his place of birth be listed as
Jerusalem, Israel, on his official documents but was told the State Department forbid this action.
In September of 2003, Menachem's parents filed for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking an
order directing the State Department to comply with Section 214(d). On remand, the district
court dismissed the action due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the claim to be a
nonjusticiable political question. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the
district court's ruling, holding the State Department's refusal to comply with Petitioner's request
is an exercise of the President's recognition power and as such, presents a nonjusticiable political
question.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the "political question doctrine" deprives a federal court of
jurisdiction to enforce a federal statute that explicitly directs the Secretary of State how to record
the birthplace of an American citizen on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and on a passpOli;
and (2) whether Section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003,
impermissibly infringes the President's power to recognize foreign sovereigns.
Ari Z. ZIVOTOFSKY, M.B.Z. by his Parents And Guardians amI Naomi Siegman
Zivotofsky, M.B.Z. by his Parents and Guardians, Appellants.
v.
SECRETARY OF STATE, Appellee.

United States COUli of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Decided July 10,2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge:
It has been the longstanding policy of the
United States to take no side in the
contentious debate over whethe~ Jerusalem
is part of Israel. In this case, the federal
courts are asked to direct the Secretary of
State to contravene that policy and record in
official documents that Israel is the
bhihplace of a U.S. citizen born 'in

Jerusalem. Because the judiciary has no
authority to order the Executive Branch to
change the nation's foreign policy in this
matter, this case' is nonjusticiable under the
political question doctrine.
I.

That the United States expresses no official
view on the thorny issue of whether
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Jerusalem is part of Israel has been a central
and calibrated feature of every president's
foreign policy since Harry S. Truman. State
Department policy governing how to
describe the status of Jerusalem in passports
and Consular Reports of Birth of U.S.
citizens born there implements the
presidential decision to' remain neutral.
Although the State Department typically
records a passport holder's birthplace as the
nation with sovereignty over his city of
birth, passports issued to U.S. citizens born
in Jerusalem note only the city[.] The State
Department follows the same policy for
Consular Reports of Birth.
In 2002, Congress passed the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
2003, Pub.L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 1350
(2002) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2651 note
(2006)). Section 214 of the Act, entitled
"United States Policy with Respect to
Jerusalem as the Capital of Isra.el,"
challenges the Executive's position on the
status of· Jerusalem. Subsection 214(a), for
example, "urges the President '.' . to
immediately begin the process of relocating
the United States Embassy in Israel to
Jerusalem." Under subsection 214(c),
Congress forbids the Executive from using
appropriated funds for "publication of any
official governmental document which lists
countries and their capital cities unless the
publication identifies Jerusalem as the
capital ofIsrael." And subsection 214(d), th~
provision at issue in this case, states: .
Record of Place of Birth as Israel for
Passport Purposes.-For purposes of
the registration of birth, certification
of nationality, 01' issuance of a
passport of a United States citizen
born in the city of Jerusalem, the
Secretary [of State] shall, upon the
request of the citizen or the citizen's
legal guardian, record the place of
birth as Israel.

Id. § 214(d), 116 Stat. at 1366.
In a written statement issued when he signed
the bill into law, the President took the view
that section 214 is merely advisory because
a congressional command to the Executive
to change the government's position on the
status of Jerusalem would "impermissibly
interfere with the President's constitutional
authority to formulate the position of the
United States, speak for the Nation in
international affairs, and detennine the terms
on which recognition is given to foreign
states." Even in signing the Act, the
President made clear that "U.S. policy
regarding Jerusalem has not changed."
Enactment of the law provoked confusion
and criticism overseas. The U.S. Consulate
in Jerusalem informed the State Department
that "[d]espite [its] best efforts to get the
word out that U.S. policy on Jerusalem has
not changed, the reservations contained in
the President's signing statement have been
all but ignored, as Palestinians focus on
what they consider the negative precedent .
and symbolism of an American law
declaring that Israel's capital is Jerusalem."
In October 2002, Menachem Zivotofsky was
born in Jerusalem to parents who are U.S.
citizens, making him a citizen as well. In
December 2002, Menachem's mother
applied for a U.S. passport and a Consular
Report of Birth for her son at the U.S.
Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel. She requested
that both documents record her son's place
of bhih as "Jerusalem, Israel." U.S.
diplomatic officials told Mrs. Zivotofsky
that State Department policy forbade them
from recording "Israel" as her son's
birthplace. Consistent with its policy, the
State Department issued a passpOli and
Consular Report of Birth identifyin'g
"Jerusalem" as Menachem's place of biiih
without reference to Israel.
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In September 2003, Menachem (by. his
parents) filed this action for declaratory and
injunctive relief ordering the State
Department to comply with the directive in
section 214(d) and record "Jerusalem,
Israel," as his birthplace in both his passport
and Consular Report of Birth. The district
court ruled that Menachem lacked standing
to complain about the contents of the
documents because he could use them
regardless of how they described his
birthplace. Invoking the political question
doctrine, the court also concluded that it was
without jurisdiction to consider his claim
because there is "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department." Zivotofsky
v. Sec 'y of State, No. 03-1.921, slip op. at 9
(D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004)[.] In the district
court's view, the "desired passport wording.
. . would confer recognition in an official,
diplomatic document that Israel has
sovereignty over Jerusalem." Such a result,
the court held, would unlawfully trench
upon the Executive's exclusive power to
recognize foreign governments.
We reversed the district court's decision on
standing, concluding that the relevant issue
is not whether Zivotofsky can use his
passport. He has standing because
"Congress conferred on him an individual
right to have 'Israel' listed as his place of
birth on his passport and on his Consulm
Birth Report," and "the Secretary. of State
violated that individual right." Zivotoftky v.
Sec'y of State, 444 F.3d 614, 619
(D.C.Cir.2006). We also remanded the case
for the district court to determine whether
section 214(d) is mandatory or advisory,
develop a more complete record, and
consider the implications, if any, of
Zivotofsky's request, first made in his
motion for summmy judgment, that his
passport and Consular Report of Birth
record "Israel" as his place of birth, instead
of noting "Jerusalem, Israel," as he pleaded

in the complaint. On remand, the district
court granted the Secretary's motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(1),
holding again that because the complaint
asserts a claim. that implicates the
President's recognition power, it "raises a
quintessential political question which is not
justiciable by the courts." Zivotojsky v. Sec 'y
of State, 511 F.Supp.2d 97, 102
(D.D.C.2007).
Zivotofsky appeals the district court's
dismissal of his case, which we review de
novo. We have jurisdiction to consider the
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). The
threshold question before us is whether the
courts have jurisdiction to provide
Zivotofsky the relief he seeks or whether he
must pursue his remedies from the political
branches.
II.

In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court held
that courts may not consider claims that
raise issues whose resolution has been
committed to the political branches by the
text of the Constitution. 369 U.S. at 217,82
S.Ct. 691. Following the framework laid out
in Nixon v. United States, we begin by
"interpret[ing] the [constitutional] text in
question and determin[ing] whether and to
what extent the issue is textually committed"
to a political branch. 506 U.S. 224, 228, 113
S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993)[.] But to
perform the ~nalysis prescribed by Nixon,
we must first determine "the issue" before
us. Only then can we decide whether that
issue has been committed by the
Constitution solely to the political branches
or whether it is a proper matter for the
judiciary to resolve. Relying on section
of the
Foreign
Relations
214(d)
Authorization Act, Zivotofsky asked the
district court to "order[ ] the [Secretary of
State] to issue a passport to [him] specifying
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[his] place of birth as [Israel]" and to
instruct the Executive "to comply with
Section 214(d)." Given Zivotofsky's claim,
the issue before us is whether the State
Department can lawfully refuse to record his
place of birth as "Israel" in the· face of a
statute that directs it to do so. The issue is
not, as the concurrence asserts, "[w]hether §
214(d) . . . is a constitutionally valid
enactment," Concurring Op. at 1234. This
critical difference sets us on different paths
at the very outset.
It is well established that the Constitution's

. grant of authority to the President to
"receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers," includes the power to recognize
foreign governments. That this power
belongs solely to the PreSIdent has been
clear from the earliest days of the Republic.
The Supreme Court has recognized this
constitutional commitment of authority to
the President repeatedly and consistently
over many years.
The President's exercise of the recognition
power granted solely to him by the
Constitution cannot be reviewed by the
courts. A decision made by the President
regarding which government is sovereign
over a particular place is an exercise of that
power. As the Supreme Court explained
nearly two hundred years ago, "when the .
executive branch . . . assume[s] a fact in
regard to the sovereignty of any island or
country, it is conclusive .on the judicial
department." As a result, we have declined
invitations to question the President's use of
the recognition power.
Thus the President has exclusive and
unreviewable .constitutional power to keep
the United States out of the debate over the
of
Jerusalem.
Nevertheless,
status
Zivotofsky asks us to review a policy of the
State
Department
implementing
the
President's decision. But as the Supreme

Court has explained, policy decisions made
pursuant to the President's recognition
power are nonjusticiable political questions.
And every president since 1948 has, as a
matter of official policy, purposefully
avoided taking a position on the issue
whether Israel's sovereignty extends to the
city of Jerusalem. The State Department's
refusal to record "Israel" in passports and
Consular Reports of Birth of U.S. citizens
bom in Jerusalem implements this
longstanding policy of the Executive. By
asking the judiciary to order the State
Department to mark official government
documents in a manner that would directly
contravene
the
President's
policy,
Zivotofsky invites the courts to call into
question the President's exercise of the
recognition power. This we cannot do. We
therefore hold that Zivotofsky's claim
presents a nonjusticiable political question
because it trenches upon the President's
constitutionally committed recognition
power.
Zivotofsky argues that the political question
doctrine cannot foreclose a court from
enforcing a duly enacted law. In his view,
this court is asked to do nothing more than
interpret a federal statute-a task within our
power and competency. To grant the
requested relief would not require that we
determine the status of Jerusalem, he argues,
because enactment of section 214(d) has
decided that question. Enforcement of the
rights Congress created presents no political
question. The government responds that
even if we find jurisdiction to consider
Zivotofsky's claim, we· must nevertheless
strike section 214(d) as an unconstitutional
infringement on the President's recognition
power. We agree that resolving Zivotofsky's
claim either at the jurisdictional stage under
the political question doctrine or on the
merits by striking section 214(d) implicates
the recognition power. Only the Executivenot Congress and not the courts-has the
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power to define U.S. policy regarding
Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem and
decide how best to implement that policy.
The question for us is whether Zivotofsky
loses on jurisdictional grounds, or on the
merits because Congress lacks the power to
give him an enforceable right to have
"Israel" noted as his birthplace on his
government documents.
Under the Supreme Court's precedent and
our own, the answer must be the former. We
are aware of no court that has held we
cannot or need not conduct the jurisdictional
analysis called for by the political question
doctrine simply because the claim asserted
involves a statutory right. We must always
begin by interpreting the constitutional text
in question and detelmining "whether and to
what extent the issue is textually
committed." The question is not whether the
courts are competent to interpret a statute.
Certainly we are. But as our recent decision
makes clear, we will decline to "resolve [a]
case through . . . statutory construction"
when it "presents a political question which
strips us of jurisdiction to undertake that
otherwise familiar task." In a case such as
this, to borrow the words of Professor
Wechsler, "abstention of decision" is
required because deciding whether the
Secretary of State must mark a passport and
Consular Report of Birth as Zivotofsky
requests would necessarily draw us into an.
area of decisionmaking the Constitution
leaves to the Executive alone. That Congress
took a position on the status of Jerusalem
and gave Zivotofsky a statutory cause of
action in an effort to make good on its
pronouncement is of no moment to whether
the judiciary has authority to resolve this
dispute between the political branches. We
have never relied on the presence or absence
of a statutory challenge in deciding whether
the political question doctrine applies. We
. decline to be the first court to hold that a .
statutory challenge to executive action

trumps the analysis in Baker and Nixon and
renders the political question doctrine
inapplicable.
III.
. Because we conclude that Zivotofsky's
complaint raises a nonjusticiable political
question, we affirm the district court's
dismissal of his suit for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Lacking authority to
consider the case, we do not address the
merits of the parties' other arguments. The
judgment of the district court is
Affirmed

EDWARDS,
concurring:

Senior

Circuit

Judge,

.' * * *
In defending against Zivotofsky's action in
this case, the Secretary has pressed two
principal arguments:
[1] Zivotofsky has no judicially
enforceable right because his
complaint presents a' political
question. The power to recognize
foreign sovereigns-including the
power to recognize claims over
territory-is
disputed
foreign
textually
committed
by
the
Constitution to the President, and is
therefore not subject to judicial
override.
[2]
Section
214(d)
is
unconstitutiorial. Aliicle II assigns to
the President the exclusive power to
recognize foreign sovereigns, and
Congress has no authority to
override or intrude on that power.
Appellee's Br. at 18,21.
The Secretary's first argument-that
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Zivotofsky's claim is a nonjusticiable
political
question-is
specious.
The
Secretary's second argument, contesting the
constitutionality of § 214(d), stands on solid
footing.

1. THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRlNE HAS NO APPLICATION IN
THIS CASE
A. The Issue Before the Court

The Secretary does not doubt that
Zivotofsky has standing to raise a viable
cause of action under § 214(d) of the
Foreign Relations Authorizatjons Act. Nor
does the Secretary doubt that Zivotofsky
properly invoked the District Court's
statutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1331, 1346(a)(2), and 1361. Therefore, the
issue before this court is:
Whether § 214(d) of the Foreign
Relations Authorizations Act, which
affords Zivotofsky a statutory right
to have "Israel" listed as the place of
birth on . . his passport, is a
constitutionally valid enactment.

***
C. Nonjusticiable "Political Questions"
The political question doctrine embraces a
limited exception to the rule that "federal
comis lack the authority to abstain from the
exercise of jurisdiction that has been
conferred." As the Supreme Court explained
in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct.
691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), "[w]here the
Constitution assigns a partiCUlar function
wholly and
indivisibly to
another
. department, the federal judiciary does not
intervene." The converse of this proposition
is that a federal court must not abstain from
the exercise of jurisdiction that has been
conferred, unless it has been asked to
. conclusively resolve 'a question that is
"wholly and indivisibly" committed by'the
Constitution to a political branch of.
government. "Underlying these assertions is
the undisputed constitutional principle that
Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the
scope of federal jurisdiction within the
constitutionally permissible bounds."
The Supreme Court has described the
political question doctrine as follows:

, Put another way, the court must decide:
Whether, in enacting § 214(d), a
provision purporting to address
"United States Policy with Respect
to Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel,"
Congress impermissibly intruded on
the President's exclusive power to
recognize foreign sovereigns.
These questions involve commonplace
issues of statutory and constitutional
interpretation, and they are plainly matters
for the court to decide. And in answering
these questions, this court has no occasion to
address a "political question" that is
reserved to the exclusive authority of one of
the political branches of government.

Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political
depmiment; or a lack of judicially
discoverable
and
manageable
standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of
government or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a
37

political deCision already made; .or
the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one
question.

"case or controversy" within the
meaning of that section; or the cause
is not one described by any
jurisdictional statute.

Id.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691; see
also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941, 103
S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983); United
States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-

90, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990).
As explained below, this case in no way fits
within the frame of the Baker v. Carr
"political question" paradigm.
D. The Crucial Distinction
Jurisdiction and Nonjusticiability

Between

In explaining the political question doctrine,
the Court in Baker .v. Carr was careful to
amplify a crucial distinction between "cases
withholding federal judicial relief [1]
restring] upon a lack of federal jurisdiction
[and] [2] upon the inappropriateness of the
subject matter for judicial considerationwhat
[the
Court
has]
designated
'nonjusticiability. ,,, 369 U.S. at 198, 82
S.Ct. 691
The distinction between the two
grounds is significant. In the instance
of nonjusticiability, consideration of
the cause is not wholly and
immediately foreclosed; rather, the
Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds
to the point of deciding whether the
duty asserted can be judicially
identified and its breach judicially
determined, and whether protection
for the right asserted can be
judicially molded. In the instance of
lack of jurisdiction the cause either
does not "arise under" the Federal
Constitution, laws or treaties (or fall
within one of the other enumerated
categories of Art. III, § 2), or is not a

When a federal court dismisses a case
because it presents a "political question," it
does so not because the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction but, rather, because the
"duty asserted can[not] . be judicially
identified and its breach judicially
determined." "[T]he mere fact that [a] suit
seeks protection of a political right does not
mean it presents a political question." And
"it is error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial cognizance." As noted
scholars have pointed out, "[i]nterpretation
of statutes affecting foreign affairs is not
likely to be barred by [the] political-question
doctrine."
The political question doctrine is purposely
very narrow in scope, lest the courts use it as
a vehicle "to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given." As the Court
noted in Baker,
[t]he doctrine of which we treat is
one of "political questions," not one
of "political cases." The courts
cannot reject as "no law suit" a bona
fide controversy as to whether some
action
denominated
"political"
exceeds constitutional authority.
369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691.
Unsurprisingly, federal cases in which
subject matter jurisdiGtion anq. standing are
properly asserted are rarely dismissed as
nonjusticiable pursuant to the political
question doctrine. Indeed, since Baker, the
Supreme Court has only dismissed two cases
as
presenting nonjusticiable political
38

questions.
The Supreme COUli often hears and decides
cases bearing major foreign policy
implications. These cases are not dismissed
pursuant to the political question doctrine.
The reason is simple: Although the
establishment of policies governing foreign
relations is the business of the political
branches, the determinat~on of the meaning
and legality of a congressionally enacted
statute is the business of the cOUlis.
E. The Legal Principles Controlling This
Case
The principles enunciated by Baker and its
progeny are really quite simple to
comprehend and apply in this case. The
controlling principles governing this case
are these:
•. The federal courts decide matters of
statutory constmction and constitutional
interpretation.
• When the federal courts review the
constitutionality of a challenged statute, they
do not infringe the authority of the
legislative branch. In Munoz-Flores, 495
U.S. at 390, 110 S.Ct. 1964, the Supreme
Court tellingly stated:
The Government may be right that a
judicial finding that Congress has
passed an unconstitutional law might
in some sense be said to entail a
"lack of respect" for Congress'
judgment. But disrespect, in the
sense the Government uses the term,
cannot be sufficient to create a
political question. If it were, every
judicial resolution of a constitutional
a congressional
challenge to
enactment would·be impermissible.

• The federal courts may not decide art issue
whose resolution is committed by the
Constitution to the exclusive authority of a
political branch of government. This does
not mean that a court may not decide a case
that merely implicates a matter within the
authority of a political branch. Congress,
alone, has the authority to pass legislation,
but it does not follow from this that the
courts are without authority to assess the
constitutionality of a statute that has been
properly challenged. Rathel', the political
question doctrine bars judicial review only
when the precise matter to be decided has
been constitutionally committed to the
exclusive authority of a political branch of
government.
• The courts may, however, decide whether
and to what extent a matter is reserved to the
exclusive authority of a political branch.
• The courts routinely adjudicate separationof-powers claims. As the COUli noted in
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 393, 110 S.Ct.
1964:
In many cases involving claimed
separation-of-powers violations, the
branch whose power has allegedly
been appropriated has both the
incentive to protect its prerogatives
and institutional mechanisms to help
it do so. Nevertheless, the Court
adjudicates those separation-ofpowers claims, often without
suggesting that they might raise,
political questions. In short, the fact
that one institution of Government
has mechanisms available to guard
against incursions into its power by
other governmental institutions does
not require that the Judiciary remove
itself .from the controversy by
labeling the issue a political
question.
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• If a federal court finds that a political
branch has overreached in its claim of
constitutionally committed authority, the
court will decide the matter that is properly
before it for resolution on the merits.
• If a federal court determines that a political
branch has acted within the compass of
exclusive authority granted to it by the
Constitution, the coUrt may determine
whether the other branch has acted to
infringe that authority. The court does not
review the substantive decision reached by
the branch with exclusive authority; it
merely determines whether the exercise of
that authority has been infringed by the
other branch.
F. The Zivotofsky
Justiciable

Claim

is

Plainly

In light of the legal principles that control
this case, the Secretary's attempt to invoke
the political question doctrine is meritless.
The following example amplifies the point:
Assume
that
a
lawfully
enacted
congressional
statute
provides
that
individuals over the age of 18 have a right to
secure a passport on their own. Assume
further that the statute gives individuals an
.enforceable right of action. If the Secretary
of State adopts a policy pursuant to which
18-year-olds are denied passports without
parental consent, claiming an exercise of the
Executive's recognition power, an aggrieved
party would have a right of action to
challenge the Secretary .. A federal court
hearing the case would be without authority
to dismiss the action as a nonjusticiable
political question. Why? Because the
plaintiff has standing to pursue her claim
and the COUlt has jurisdiction to hear it. And
the court would be well able to evaluate the
competing claims of power and easily
determine that the Executive overreached in
its claim to exclusive authority under the

recognition power. The court would find no
valid exercise of textually committed power
by the executive branch.
The flip side of this example is seen in a
case like Nixon, 506 U.S. 224, 113 S.Ct.
732. In Nixon, the petitioner asked the Court
to decide whether Senate Rule XI, which
allowed "a committee of Senators to hear
evidence against an individual who has been
impeached and to report that evidence to the
full Senate," violated the Constitution's
Impeachment Trial Clause[.] The Trial
Clause provides that the "Senate shall have
the sole Power to try all Impeachments."
The Court first found that this provision
reflects a clear "grant of authority to the
Senate, and the word 'soie' indicates that
this authority is reposed in the Senate and
nowhere else." Having found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the impeachment issue to a coordinate
political department, the Court held that the
action involved a nonjusticiable political
question. . Zivotofsky's claim, which is
founded on a cause of action under § 214(d),
is nothing like Nixon's clairri.
In this case, there are two questions that are
properly before the court: (1) whether the
Executive's passpOlt policy reflects an
action taken within the President's exclusive
power to recognize foreign sovereigns; and
(2) if so, whether Congress' enactment of §
214(d) impermissibly intruded on the
President's exclusive power to recognize
foreign sovereigns. These questions raise
issues that are constitutionally committed to
the judicial branch to decide. Zivotofsky's
claim resting on § 214(d) does not require
this court to evaluate the wisdom of the
Executive's foreign affairs decisions or to
determine the political status of Jerusalem.
The court's role in this case is to determine
the constitutionality of a congressional
enactment. And this role is well within the
constitutional authority of the judiciary.
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II.
SECTION
214(D)
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INFRINGES
EXECUTIVE'S
EXCLUSIVE
THE
AUTHORITY
UNDER
THE
RECOGNITION POWER
Zivotofsky has asked the court to direct the
State Department to designate "Israel" as his
place of birth on his passport pursuant to
Congress' directive in § 214(d). The
Executive asselis that § 214(d), if construed
to
be
mandatory,
represents
an
unconstitutional infringement of the
President's recognition power as it concerns
Jerusalem.

A The Recognition Power
The Executive has
exclusive and
unreviewable authority to recognize foreign
sovereigns. This power derives from Article
II, § 3 of the Constitution, which gives the.
President the sole power to "receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers"
from foreign countries. The power to receive
ambassadors includes the power' to
recognize' governments with whom the
United States will establish diplomatic
relationships. This recognition power is
vested solely in the President.
. It is also clear that, under the recognition

power, the President has the sole authority to
make
determinations
regarding
the
sovereignty of disputed territories. Finally,
and impOliantly, the recognition power is
"not limited to a determination of the
government to be recognized. It includes the
power to determine the policy which is to
govern the question of recognition."
The President's Passport Policy
Regarding the Designation of Jerusalem Is
an Exercise of the Recognition Power
B.

The Executive and Congress historically
have shared authority over the regulation of

passports. However, "[f]rom the outset,
Congress [has] endorsed not only the
underlying premise of Executive authority in
the areas of foreign policy and national
security, but also its specific application to
the subject of passports. Early Congresses
enacted statutes expressly recognizing the
Executive authority with respect to
passports." Congress passed the first
Passport Act in 1856, endorsing the
Executive's power to control passports[.]
The current Passport ACt maintains this
recognition of Executive authority.
Although Congress often has recognized the
authority of the Executive to regulate the
issuance of passports, this obviously doe~
not confirm that the Executive retains
exclusive control over all matters relating t6
passports.
fudeed,
the
history
of
congressional legislation in this area
suggests otherwise. It is clear, however, that
Congress lacks the power to interfere with a
passport policy adopted by the Executive in
lllliherance of the recognition power.
Appellant Zivotofsky does not dispute this.
Rather, Zivotofsky contends that the
passport rules regarding Israel do not
embody a policy in furtherance of the
Executive's recognition power. Zivotofsky's
po~ition fails. The record in this case
suppOlis the Secretary's claim that the
policy relating to the designation of
Jerusalem on passports lawfully "govem[s]
the question of reco gnition."
"The status of Jerusalem is one of the most
sensitive and long-standing disputes in the
Arab-Israeli conflict, having remained
unsettled since 1948." The United States has
long refrained from recognizing Jerusalem
as a city located within the sovereign state of
Israel. Instead, United States policy since the
Truman Administration has been "to
promote a final and permanent resolution of
final status issues, including the status of
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Jerusalem, through negotiations by the
parties and supported by the international
community." .. "u.s.
Presidents
have
consistently endeavored to maintain a strict
. policy of not prejudging the Jerusalem status
issue and thus not engaging in official
actions that would recognize, or might be
perceived as constituting recognition of,
Jerusalem as either the capital city of Israel,
or as a city located within the sovereign
territory of Israel." These points are
uncontested.
The Secretary's rules regarding the
designation of Jerusalem on passports
obviously aims to further the United States'
policy regarding the recognition of Israel. ..
. There are special rules for Jerusalem
because it is a disputed territory. For citizens
born after 1948 in Jerusalem, the Birthplace
Transcription Guide instructs that only
"Jerusalem" should be recorded as the place
of birth. The Guide specifically indicates
that the official is not to write "Israel" or
"Jordan." Th~ Guide further instructs that
Israel "[d]oes not include Jerusalem or areas
under military occupation," and Jordan
"[d]oes not include Jerusalem." These rules
plainly
implement
the
Executive's
determination not to recognize Jerusalem as
part of any sovereign regime.
Zivotofsky contends that the "designation of
a passport holder's place of birth does not
involve the 'recognition of foreign
sovereigns. '" This argument misperceives
the issues in this case. As noted above, the
recognition power is "not limited to a
determination of the government to be
recognized. It includes the power to
determine the policy which is to govern the
question of recognition." The rules
regarding the designation of Jerusalem are
part of the Executive's overarching policy
governing the recognition of Israel.
Zivotofsky also claims that the "'bhihplace'

entry on a passpOli ... is nothing more than
one means of identifying the passportholder." This attempt to downplay the
significance of a passport is futile. As the
Supreme Court has said, "[a] passport is, in
a sense, a letter of introduction in which the
issuing sovereign vouches for the bearer." It
is a "political document" that is "addressed
to foreign powers," "by which the bearer is
recognized, in foreign countries, as an
American citizen." A "political document"
indicating that a person born in Jerusalem is
from the sovereign nation of Israel misstates
the United States' position on the
recognition of Israel. So long as the
Executive remains neutral on the question of
Jerusalem, the Secretary surely may adopt
polices declining to issue official documents
that suggest otherwise.
Finally, Zivotofsky argues that, because the
Secretary's passport rules concerning
Jerusalem have only a "negligible impact on
American foreign policy," the rules cannot
be viewed as policy governing the
recognition of Israel. The Secretary responds
by pointing to evidence of the international
reaction to the enactment of § 214 in 2002.
According to the State Department,
"Palestinians from across the political
spectrum strongly condemned the Jerusalem
provisions of the [Act], interpreting those
provisions as a reversal of longstanding U.S.
policy that Jerusalem's status should be
determined by Israel and the Palestinians in
final status talks." One need not assess the
international reaction to § 214 to find that
the Secretary's rules regarding the
designation of Jerusalem on passports aims
to further the United States' policy of
neutrality on the question of Jerusalem. It is
obvious. The Executive's policy is not to
prejudge the status of Jerusalem, and any
official statement to the contrary impinges
upon the Executive's prerogative. The
Executive has the exclusive authority to
implement policies in furtherance of th~
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recognition power and this court has no
authority to second-guess the Executive's
. judgment when, as here, it is clear that the
disputed policy is in furtherance of the
recognition power.
C. Section 214(d) is a Mandatory Statutory
Provision
The Secretary also argues that "Section
214(d) constitutes only a legislative
recommendation-not a command-to the
Executive Branch with respect to
recognition of sovereignty over JelUsalem,"
and therefore there is no reason for this court
to opine on its constitutionality. The District
Court rejected this argument, finding that "it
is difficult to constlUe Section 214(d) as
. anything but mandatory." Zivotofsky ex reI.
Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 511 F.Supp.2d
97, 105 (D.D.C.2007). This IS an
understatement. Section 214(d) states,
"[T]he Sec~etary shall, upon the request of
the citizen or the citizen's legal guardian,
record the place of birth as Israel." As
appellant aptly notes, "section 214(d) is as
mandatory as a statute can be." The words
of the statute make it plain that "Congress
was fully aware when it enacted the law that
the Secretary of State was acting differently
than Congress wanted him to act. It enacted
subsection (d) with the specific intent of
altering the State Depaliment practice."
Section 214(d) is plainly mandatory. The
provision dictates that the Secretary shall
record Israel as the place of birth upon the
request of a citizen who is born in JelUsalem
and entitled to a United States passport.
"Shall" has long been understood as "the
language of command."
There are rare exceptions to this lUle that
apply only where it would make little sense
to interpret "shall" as "must." There is no
evidence in this case that the legislature
intended "shall" in § 214(d) to mean

anything other than "must." Indeed, when §
214(d)'is read in conjunction with the title of
§ 214-"United States Policy with Respect to
Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel "-there
can be little doubt about Congress' intent.
This conclusion is bolstered by reference to·
the language in § 214(a), where Congress
merely "urges the President . . . to
immediately begin the process of relocating
the United States Embassy in Israel to
JelUsalem." Given the stlUcture of the
statute, Congress obviously understood the
difference between an advisory provision
and a statutory command. Section 214(d) is
undoubtedly mandatory.
The Secretary also argues that "Section
214(d) should be interpreted as advisory to
avoid constitutional doubt." However,
because the statute is unambiguous, the
canon of constitutional avoidance does not
apply in this case. The congressional
command of § 214(a) is clear and
unmistakable; therefore, this court is obliged
to render a decision on its constitutionality.
D. Section 214(d) Unconstitutionally
Infringes the President's Exclusive Power to
Recognize Foreign Sovereigns
The final question in this case is whether §
of
the
Foreign. Relations
214(d)
Authorizations
Act,
which
affords
Zivotofsky a statutory right to have ."Israel"
listed as the place of birth on his passport, is
a constitutionally valid enactment. Given the
mandatory terms of the statute, it can·hardly
be doubted that § 214(d) intlUdes on the
President's
recognition
power.
In
commanding that the Secretary shall record
Israel as the place of birth upon the request
of a citizen who is born in JelUsalem and
entitled to a United States· passport, the
statute plainly defies the Executive's
determination to the contrary. As noted
above, the rules adopted by the Secretary of
State explicitly ban government officials
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from recording ~'Israel" as the place of birth
for citizens born in Jerusalem. Section
214(d) effectively vitiates the Executive's
policy.
Zivotofsky argues that § 214(d) cannot be
seen to interfere with the Executive's
recognition power, because the statute here
is no different from another uncontested
legislative action taken by Congress with
respect to Taiwan. In 1994, Congress
enacted a provision requiring that, "[f]or
purposes of the registration of birth or
certificate of nationality of a United States
citizen born in Taiwan, the Secretary of
State shall permit the place of birth to be
recorded as Taiwan." This example is
inapposite. Following the enactment of the
statute covering Taiwan, the State
Department
determined
that
the
congressional provision was consistent with
the United States' policy that the People's
Republic of China is the "sole legal
government of China" and "Taiwan is a part
of China." Because listing "Taiwan" did not
contravene
the
President's
position
regarding China's sovereignty, the State
Department allowed American citizens born
in Taiwan to record "Taiwan" as their place
of birth. The present case is different from
the Taiwan example. The State Department
here has determined that recording Israel as

the place of birth for United States citizens
born in Jerusalem misstates the terms of this
country's recognition ofIsraei.
The more important point here is that the
President has the exclusive power to
establish the policiesgoveming the
recognition of foreign sovereigns. The
Executive may treat different· situations
differently, depending upon how the
President assesses each situation. These are
matters within the exclusive power of the
Executive under Art. II, § 3, and neither
Congress nor the Judiciary has the authority
to second-guess the Executive's policies
governing the terms of recognition.
"[I]t remains a basic principle of our
constitutional scheme that one branch of the
government may not intrude upon the
central prerogatives of another." In my view,
the bottom line of the court's judgment in
this case is inescapable: "Section 214(d) is
unconstitutional. Article II assigns to the
President the exclusive power to recognize
foreign sovereigns, and Congress has no
authority to override or intrude on that
power." Section 214(d) impermissibly
intrudes on the President's exclusive power
to recognize foreign sovereigns. Because
appellant Zivotofsky has no viable cause of
action under § 214(d), I concur in the
judgment.
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'" Jerusalem' or 'Israel?' Supreme Court Case Raises
Trove of Constitutional Questions"
. Washington Post

May 8, 2011
Robert Barnes
Young Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky, an
8-year-old American born in. Jerusalem,
likes to brag to his older siblings that he is
the only one of them born in Israel.
He and his parents would like the U.S.
government to agree.
But the Zivotofskys' request to change
Menachem's passport to say his birthplace is
"Israel" rather than simply "Jerusalem" has
met firm resistance from the State
Department.
"The status of Jerusalem is one of the most
sensitive and long-standing disputes in the
Arab-Israeli conflict," the government said
in its brief to the court. It is not one in which
the United States has been willing to choose
sides.
Over the objection of the Obama
administration, the Supreme Court last week
agreed to review the long-running dispute
over Menachem's passport. The slim
petition filed by veteran Supreme Court
practitioner Nathan Lewin manages to pack
in a trove of constitutional questions for
argument next fall.
It raises a broad separation of powers
. question about Congress' power to influence
the nation's foreign policy. It broaches the
question of when courts may get involved in
settling such disputes between the legislative
and executive branches. And it even touches
on the unsettled question of presidential
"signing statements," in which the president

signs a bill while declaring he will ignore
parts he considers unconstitutional.

u.s. recognition of Jerusalem is a perennial
question for American politicians, but one
that American diplomats consider best left
for negotiations between Israeli and
Palestinian officials. Israel has had control
of the once-divided city since the 1967 war,
and considers it the capital; the United
States maintains its embassy in Tel Aviv.
In 2002, Congress passed a provision in a
broader foreign relations act that said
Americans born in Jerusalem could request
that official documents recognize their
birthplace as "Israel."
President George W. Bush signed the law,
but said in a signing statement that U.S.
policy regarding Jerusalem had not changed.
prOVlSlon,
he
said,
would
The
"impermissibly interfere with the president's
constitutional authority to formulate the
position of the United States, speak for the
nation in international affairs and determine
the terms on which recognition is given to
foreign states;"
Not long after, Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky,
Americans who moved to Israel in 2000, had
a baby boy in a hospital. in West Jerusalem .
Naomi Zivotofsky's request that her son's
Consular RepOli of Birth Abroad and his
passport list the country of his birth as Israel
were denied.
The Zivotofskys sued, but a district judge in
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Washington dismissed the case, saying it
"raises a quintessential political question
which is not justiciable by the courts."
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit agreed. But Senior Judge Harry
T. Edwards disagreed, saying the court
should have moved on to hear the merits of
the arguments. The case, he said, "raises an
extraordinarily important question" that
"calls into question the role of a federal
court in our system of justice."
(Edwards' bottom line, though, is of little
help to the family: he concluded that while
the court should have considered the case,
he would have found the 2002 congressional
language unconstitutional because it
"impermissibly intrudes on the president's
exclusive power to recognize foreign
sovereigns. ")
Lewin is encouraged that the Supreme Court
asked for a briefing on both questionswhether the courts should hear the case and
whether
Congress'
actions
were
unconstitutional.

He believes the D.C. Circuit Court got it
wrong. He said the Zivotofskys are not
asking the courts to decide a matter of
foreign policy, but simply to enforce a law
that Congress has passed and the president
has signed.
The circuit court's refusal to even hear the
merits of the suit is an "abdication of the
court's duty to determine the lawfulness of
governmental conduct that affects the rights
of individual citizens," Lewin said in his
brief.
Ari Zivotofsky, a neuroscience researcher at
an Israeli university, said he and his wife
were aware they were testing the law with
their request, "but I can't say I expected it
would end up at the Supreme Court."
But he said it is important "really for the
same reason we moved here-to live in the
state of Israel." He added: "Jews for
thousands of years prayed daily to be able to
go to Jerusalem."
The case is M.R.Z. v. Clinton and will be
heard in the court's next term.
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"A Political Question, or a Judicial
One-and Then What?"
National Review
May 12,2011
Matthew J. Franck

Legal scholars-not to mention judges-live
or die professionally with the myth that.
constitutional questions are so frequently
hard ones. In truth, while the Jaw has many
procedural· intricacies grounded in statutes,
rules, and precedents, most questions of
constitutional interpretation aren't all that
hard. The case of Zivotofsky v. SecretarY of
State seems to be one of the rare hard ones.
Since its recognition of the state of Israel in
1948, the United States has officially treated
the status of Jerusalem as unresolved-not
only the question whether Jerusalem is to be
considered Israel's capital, but whether. it is
part ofIsrael's sovereign territory in the first
place. This underlies the refusal of president
after president to move the U.S. embassy
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
It is also the longstanding practice of the
State Department that when a U.S. citizen is
born in Jerusalem (i.e., a child of sojourning
American parents), the department will
issue, on request, a "consular report of birth"
as well as a passpoli, giving the place of
birth simply as "Jerusalem," with no country
specified.

Enter the Congress. In its 2002 authorization
act for State, Congress directed that the
Secretary of State "shall," in such
documents, for citizens born in Jerusalem,
"record the place of birth as Israe1." Now
comes Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky,
born in October 2002 in Jerusalem. His
parents have been requesting, and
subsequently litigating for, such documents
for young Menachem since he was an infant.

President George W. Bush, in a signing
statement regarding the 2002 statute,
declared the executive branch· would not
consider itself bound by this provision of it,
arguing that it "impermissibly interferes"
with the president's control of foreign
relations. But whence comes this control? In
this context, it rests entirely on some
innocuous words in Article II,. that the
president "shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers." In due. course-and
fairly rapidly-this clause took on rather
large meiming, that presidents and only
presidents, without any role for the
Congress, could give or withhold
recognition of another nation's sovereignty,
by the simple act of receiving or not
receiving its ambassador, establishing or
declining to establish diplomatic relations.
In international law and foreign relations,
this is a very big deal, and it often impinges
on domestic legal questions as well.
The Obama administration is following the
Bush lead here, and so far it's winning. In
2009 a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit·
ruled that the question raised in the case is a
"political" one, not to be decided by the
judges at all-which meant no decision. on
the merits but a de facto victory for State's
refusal of the Zivotofsky family's demand,
and de facto nuilification of the statutory
requirement. One judge, Harry Edwards,
wrote that the issue was not political, and so
could be decided on the merits-but that he
would decide in the executive branch's
favor. In 2010, the full D.C. Circuit denied
en banc rehearing. Now the Supreme Court
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has accepted the case for review in its next
October term.

core executive power lurking in this merely
ministerial duty?

The notion of "political questions" is a
venerable one, traceable all the way back to
. Marbury v. Madison (1803) itself, the very
case that first enunciated the federal
judiciary's power to treat some statutes as
unconstitutional. Is this a case. in such a
category? One would be hard pressed to see
how courts could adjudicate, for instance,
the executive's choice to recognize a certain
country and not another, or one putative
government of a country and not a rival
faction claiming to be the government, in his
reception of some ambassadors and not
others.

John Marshall said in Marbury that
"questions, in their nature political" are none
of the judiciary'S business, and the
paradigmatic case involved those questions
that "respect the nation, not individual
rights," and thus were questions on which
the executive's discretion was "conclusive."
But he also said that "the question whether a
right has vested or not is, in its nature,
judicial, and must be tried by the judicial
authority." Which sort of situation is the
Zivotofsky case?

But since 1948, the U.S. has consistently
recognized Israel. Is Congress foreclosed
from all participation in regulating the U.S.Israel
. relationship
(other
than
. appropriations)? Is it barred from legislating
on the rights of American citizens .born
overseas, such that it cannot impose the
ministerial duty on. executive branch
functionaries that they identify the state of
Israel as the birthplace of Americans born in
Jerusalem? Or is a large encroachment on a

I incline towm'd the view that a legal right is
involved here· and so the Court should not
dodge it with talk of its "political" character.
And if the merits are reached, I don't see
how Judge Edwards' pro-executive view can
prevail here. That is, it's either a political
question or the· Zivotofskys win on the
merits, and I think the second outcome
makes more sense. On balance, I'm with
Seth Lipsky, who wrote about this case the
other day in the Wall Street Journal.
But it's a tougher case than most.
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Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California
09-958

Maxwell-Jolly v. California Pharmacists Association
09-1158

Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital
10-283
Ruling Below:

Indep. Living Ctr. of S. California, Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009)
cert. granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 992 (U.S. 2011).
California Pharmacists Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2010) cert.
granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 992 (U.S. 2011); Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger, 596 F.3d
1087 (9th Cir. 201 0) cert. granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 992 (U.S. 2011).
Santa Rosa Mem'l Hosp. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 380 F. App'x. 656 (9th Cir. 2010) cert.
granted in part.. 131 S. Ct. 996 (U.S. 2011).
In February of 2008, California altered Medi-Cal, the state's implementation of Medicaid by
passing AB 5. Section 14105.l9 reduced payments to a number of health care providers and
facilities by 10%. Section 14166.245 reduced inpatient services for acute care hospitals not under
contract with the state by 10%. The plaintiffs in Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of
Southern California were both providers and beneficiaries that were affected by the passage of
AS 5. Plaintiffs argued AB5 violated the .Supremacy Clause because it was inconsistent with the
requirement of 42 U.S.C. 1396(a)(30)(A) ("30(A)") that payments assure efficiency, economy,
and quality of care. On remand, the District Court granted preliminary injunctive relief to the
plaintiffs, holding they had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits due to the
Director's failure to present evidence the impact of AB 5 had been duly considered. That order
was amended to apply only proactively, as the District Court held retroactive application would
be inconsistent with the state's sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
injunctive relief and reversed on the sovereign immunity issue finding the state had waived that
immunity.
Subsequently, California enacted AB 1183 which scaled back on the changes introduced by AB
5. Instead of a broad 10% reduction, AB 1183 created a schedule of one, five, or ten percent
reductions based on the type of provider. The plaintiffs in California Pharmacists Association v.
Maxwell-Jolly represented adult day health care centers that faced a five percent reduction in
payments under AB 1183. Plaintiffs challenged AB 1183 on the same grounds as Independent
Living and prevailed at both the district and circuit court levels on the same reasoning. Similarly,
the Ninth Circuit held Independent Living controlled when it affirmed the district court's grant of
preliminary injunctive relief in Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital v. Maxwell-Jolly.
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Question Presented: Whether Medicaid recipients and providers may maintain a cause of action
under the Supremacy Clause to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) by asserting that the provision
preempts a state law reducing reimbursement rates?
INDEPENDENT LIVING CENTER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC., a nonprofit
corporation; Gray Panthers of Sacramento, a nonprofit corporation; Gray Panthers of San
Francisco, a nonprofit corporation; Gerald Shapiro, Pharm. D. doing business as Uptown
Pharmacy and Gift Shoppe; Sharon Steen doing business as Central Pharmacy; Mark
Beckwith; Margaret Dowling; Tran Pharmacy, Inc. doing business as Tran Pharmacy;
Jason Young, Petitioners-Appellees,
Sacramento Family Medical Clinics, Inc.; Theodore Mazer M.D.; Ronald B. Mead; Acacia
Adult Day Services, Interveners-Appellees,

v.
David MAXWELL-JOLLY, Director of the Department of Health Care Services, State of
California, Respondent-Appellant.
Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc., a nonprofit corporation; Gray
Panthers of Sacramento, a nonprofit corporation; Gray Panthers of San Francisco, a
nonprofit corporation; Gerald Shapiro, Pharm. D. doing business as Uptown Pharmacy
and Gift Shoppe; Sharon Steen doing business as Central Pharmacy; Mark Beckwith;
Margaret Dowling; Tran.Pharmacy, Inc. doing business as Tran Pharmacy; Jason Young,
Petitioners-Appellants, Sacramento Family Medical Clinics, Inc.; Theodore Mazer M.D.;
Ronald B. Mead; Acacia Adult Day Services, Interveners-Appellees,

v.
David Maxwell-Jolly, Director of the Department of Health Care Services, State of
California, Respondent-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed July 9,2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge:
Petitioners-Appellees!Appellants
(Independent Living),
a group
of
pharmacies, health care providers, senior
citizens' groups, and beneficiaries of the
State's Medicaid program, Medi-Cal, seek
to enjoin the California Department of
Health Care Services (Department) Director,
David Maxwell-Jolly (Director) from
implementing state legislation reducing
payments to certain medical service
providers under Medi-Cal by ten percent.
We hold that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in granting Independent
Living's motion for a preliminary
injunction, because the Director failed to
"rely on responsible cost studies, its own
and others," in determining the effect of the
rate cuts mandated by AB 5 on the statutory
factors of effiCiency, economy, quality, and
access to care before implementing those
cuts. We also hold that the district court's
preliminary injunction should be modified to
cover payments for medical services
provided on or after July 1, 2008, because
the Director waived the State's sovereign
immunity in both state and federal court.
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FACTUAL
AND
BACKGROUND

PROCEDURAL

On February 16, 2008, the Califomia
Assembly passed AB 5, which added §§
14105.19 and 14166.245 to the Califomia
Welfare and Institutions Code. Section
14105.19 reduces payments under the MediCal fee-for-service program to physicians,
dentists, phmmacies, adult health care
centers, clinics, health systems, and other
providers by ten perdent. Section 14166.245
similarly reduces payments for inpatient
services provided by acute care hospitals not
under contract with the State by ten percent.
Both of these rate reductions were scheduled
to take effect on July 1, 2008.
On April 22, 2008, Independent Living filed
a verified petition for a writ of mandamus in
Los Angeles County Superior Court, seeking
to enjoin the Director from implementing
AB 5. Independent Living argued that the
ten percent rate reduction violates Title XIX
of the federal Social Security Act (the
Medicaid Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., and
is therefore invalid under the Supremacy
Clause. Specifically, Independent, Living
alleged that AB 5 is inconsistent with 42
U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A) (hereafter § 30(A)),
which requires that a state plan
methods' and
provide
such
procedures relating to the utilization
of, and payment for, care and
services available under the plan .. .
as may be necessary . . . to assure
that payments are consistent with
efficiency, economy, and quality of
care and are sufficient to enlist
enough providers so that care and
services are available under the plan
at least to the extent that such· care
and services are available to the
general population in the geographic
area.

On May 19, 2008, the Director removed this
action to federal court based on federal
question jurisdiction. On May 30, 2008,
Independent Living filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction. The district court
heard argument on June 23,2008. Two days
later, the court entered an order denying the
motion, holding that Independent Living had
not demonstrated a likelihood of success on
the merits of their preemption claim because
§ 30(A) did not create any judicially
enforceable "rights."
Independent Living then sought emergency
relief from this court. After full briefing and
argument, we vacated the district court's
order, holding that Independent Living could
bring suit directly under the Supremacy
Clause to enjoin a state law allegedly
preempted by federal law. We remanded to
the district court for reconsideration of
Independent Living's' motion for a
preliminary injunction.
On remand, the district court issued an order
granting in part and denying in part
Independent Living's motion for a
preliminary injunction. The district court
held that Independent Living had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits of its Supremacy Clause claim, as the
Director failed to provide any evidence that
the Department had considered the impact of
the ten percent rate reduction on quality and
access to care, as required by § 30(A). The
court also held that Independent Living had
demonstrated a risk of ineparable injury as
to some-but not all-of the challenged MediCal services. The' district court thus granted
the motion "to the extent that it seeks to
enjoin enforcement of Cal. Welf. &
Inst.Code § 14105.19(b)(1), which reduces
by ten percent payments under the Medi-Cal
fee-for-service program for physicians,
dentists, pharmacies, adult day health care
centers, clinics, health systems, and other
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providers· for services provided on or after
July 1, 2008." The court denied the motion
to enjoin enforcement of the rate reductions
for managed care plans and non-contract
acute care hospitals, as Independent Living·
had not shown a risk of irreparable injury as
to those services.
On August 27, 2008, the Director filed a
motion "to alter or amend, and clarify" the
August 18 order. The Director argued that
the injunction should apply only to
payments for services provided on or after
reqU1l'1ng full
August
18, because
reimbursement for services provided prior to
the court's order would violate the State's
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
The Director also argued that the order was
vague and ambiguous and that the Ninth
Circuit had yet to rule on the Director's
petition for rehearing and rehearing en bane
regarding the Supremacy Clause right of
action issue. The district court granted the
motion in part the same day, issuing an
order
in
chambers
modifying
the
preliminary injunction to apply only to
payments "for services provided on or after
August 18, 2008." Although the order itself
did not. provide any explanation for the
modification, the district court later stated
that it was its "intention only to issue an
order that would provide for prospective
relief," and that it agreed with the Director
"that the order as it was phrased violates the
Eleventh. Amendment." The district court
also indicated that it would not grant the
Director's request for a stay and that
Independent Living's request for a contempt
citation was premature. The district court
did not afford Independent Living an
opportunity to respond to the Director's
argument before issuing its order.
The August 18 order, as modified, generated
three appeals, two of which remain before
us. In case number 08-56422, the
Directorappeals the district court's decision

to grant the motion for preliminary
injunction in part, arguing primarily that the
analysis of AB 5 conducted by the
Department was legally sufficient and
Independent Living therefore cannot
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits.
In case number 08-56554,
Independent Living appeals the district
court's August 27 order modifying the
injunction to apply only to payments for
serviCes provided on or after August 18,
arguing that the earlier order-which would
have granted relief for services provided on
or after July I-did not violate the State's
sovereign immunity. We address these
arguments in turn.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW

***
DISCUSSION
I. Independent Living's
Success on the Merits

Likelihood

of

This is not the first time that we have
interpreted the substantive and procedural
requirements of § 30(A). In Orthopaedic
Hospital v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th
Cir; 1997), several hospitals and health care
associations· alleged that the Department
violated § 3o(A) by setting provider
reimbursement rates "without proper
consideration of the effect of hospital costs
on the relevant statutory factors [of]
efficiency, economy, quality of care, and
access." We interpreted § 30(A) to require
the Director to set reimbursement rates that
"bear a reasonable relationship to efficient
. and economical hospitals' costs of providing
quality. services, unless the Department
shows some justification for rates that
substantially deviate from such costs." To
meet this statutory requirement, we held that
the Director "must rely on responsible cost
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studies, its own or others', that provide
reliable data as a basis for its rate setting."
Under the standards established in
Orthopaedic Hospital, it is clear that the
Director violated § 3o(A) when he
implemented the rate reductions mandated
by AB 5. The Director failed to provide any
evidence that the Department or the
legislature studied the impact of the ten
percent rate reduction on the statutory
factors of efficiency, economy, quality, and
access to care prior to enacting AB 5, nor
did he demonstrate that the Department
considered reliable cost studies when
adjusting its reimbursement rates. Several of
the declarations submitted by the Director
candidly admit that the Department does not
maintain information on provider costs for
covered services. In the absence of such cost
data, the Director could not have complied
with § 30(A) as interpreted in Orthopaedic
Hospital.
Perhaps as a result, the Director's primary
argument on appeal is that the standards
established in Orthopaedic Hospital are
inapplicable, for several reasons. We
address each of them.

A. Action Under the Supremacy Clause
First, the Director argues that Orthopaedic
Hospital is inapplicable because the
plaintiffs in that case were not asserting a
claim of federal preemption directly under
the Supremacy Clause. As the Director
notes, Orthopaedic Hospital addressed
claims brought to enforce the provisions of §
30(A) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
provides a remedy for deprivation of any
"rights ... secured by the Constitution and
laws" of the United States. In this case, by
contrast, Independent Living does not seek
direct enforcement of any "rights" created
by § 30(A), but rather argues that the ten
percent rate reduction conflicts with the

federal requirements established in § 30(A).
The question is whether this difference in
the theory of recovery renders Orthopaedic
Hospital's interpretation of § 30(A) any less
persuasive. To answer this question, we tum
to basic principles of conflict preemption.
"when
Conflict
preemption
arises
compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility, or
where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."
Under this latter strand of so-called
"obstruction" preemption, "an abelTant or
hostile state rule is preempted to the extent it
actually interferes with the 'methods by
which the federal statute was designed to
"Thus,
obstruction
reach[its]
goal. ",
preemption focuses on both the objective of
the federal law and the method chosen by
Congress to effectuate that objective, taking
into account the law's text, application,
history, and interpretation."
As the description above makes clear, the
first step in any conflict preemption analysis
is to detelTI1ine the purpose of the federal
law at issue. Orthopaedic Hospital discussed
the purpose underlying § 30(A) at length,
reading its text and legislative history as
demonstrating that "Congress intended
payments to be flexible within a range;
payments should be no higher than what is
required to provide efficient and economical
care, but still high enough to provide for
quality care and to ensure access to
services." We held that the Department
. could not accomplish this purpose in the
absence of some determination of "what it
costs an efficient hospital economically to
provide quality care." Thus, while the
Department "need not follow a rigid formula
of payments equal to an efficiently and
economically operated hospital's costs
regardless of other factors," § 3o(A)
required the Depilliment to at least ascertain
53

provider
costs
when
reimbursement rates.

it

adjusted

The Director has not provided any coherent
reason why the purpose underlying § 30(A)
would be different for purposes of federal
preemption than it was for direc~
enforcement under §1983, and we see none.
That Independent Living in this case has
proceeded under a different cause of action
than the plaintiffs in Orthopaedic Hospital is
therefore an inconsequential distinction. In
both cases, the central question is the
purpose underlying § 30(A), and as to that
question, Orthopaedic Hospital clearly
controls.
B. Continuing Validity of Orthopaedic
Hospital

Second, the Director argues that our more
recent decision in Sanchez, 416 F.3d 1051,
"effectively
overruled"
Orthopaedic
Hospital, and that the district court's
analysis of the merits was thus based on
legal error. This argument is unavailing.
Sanchez did not overrule Orthopaedic
Hospital's interpretation of § 30(A).
Sanchez addressed the narrow question of
"whether
. developmentally
disabled
recipients of Medicaid funds and their
service providers have a private right of
action against state officials to compel the
enforcement of a federal law governing state
disbursement of such funds." Applying the
Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga
University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct.
2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), we held that
§ 30(A) does not create any federal "rights"
enforceable under § 1983. In so holding, we
did not reach the substantive requirements of
§ 30(A), as we were concerned solely with
whether the plaintiffs in that case could
bring suit in federal court. In fact, Sanchez
.does not explore the congressional
"purpose" underlying § 30(A), the

touchstone of federal preemption analysis. If
the· Sanchez court had any qualms about
Orthopaedic
Hospital's
substantive
interpretation of § 30(A), it did not say so.
More fundamentally, Sanchez cannot be
read to have overruled Orthopaedic
Hospital, for three reasons. First,· Sanchez
does not even cite Orthopaedic Hospital,
much less overrule its holdings. Second,
Sanchez was decided by a three-judge panel
that, under our circuit rules, was powerless
to overturn one of our prior decisions in the
absence of intervening authority[.] Third, we
affirmed the "continuing vitality" of
Orthopaedic Hospital in a published opinion
filed one month after Sanchez. In that case,
the State argued-much as the Director has
here-that
subsequent
developments
Orthopaedic
Hospital
rendered
anachronistic. We were "not persuaded,"
and we noted that "the relevant language of
§. 3o(A) remains unchanged since
Orthopaedic Hospital, and thus our
interpretation of its purpose, and the' State's
obligations thereunder, still holds."
Aside from his misreading of Sanchez, the
Director also argues that Orthopaedic
Hospital is no longer good law because its
interpretation of § 30(A) "conflicts with the
interpretation of the federal agency that
Congress vested with authority to enforce
and implement" the statute. By this, the
Director apparently means that Orthopaedic
Hospital conflicts with the interpretation of
§ 30(A) presented in an amicus brief filed by
the Solicitor General when the Supreme.
Court asked him to opine on whether our
decision in Orthopaedic Hospital was
wOlihy of a grant of celiiorari. In the process
of recommending denial of certiorari, the
Solicitor General opined that requiring states
to reimburse medical providers at rates
roughly equal to their costs ran counter to
the text and legislative history of § 30(A).
From this, the Director concludes that a
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"federal
agency"
repudiated
interpretation of § 30(A).

our

Whatever the merits of the Solicitor
General's views, we owe them no deference
in this case. Although at one time the
Supreme Court suggested that a legal
opinion expressed by an agency in the
course of litigation may be entitled to
deference, it subsequently limited such
deference to an agency's interpretation of
ambiguities·in its own regulations[.]
The Director also contends that oUl; holding
in Orthopaedic Hospital has oeen
undermined by Congress's . subsequent
repeal of the so-called "Boren Amendment,"
which required states to set hospital
inpatient reimbursement rates that were
"reasonable and adequate to meet the costs
which must be incurred by efficiently and
economically operated facilities." This
argument is not persuasive either, as
Orthopaedic Hospital itself expressly
distinguished the requirements of the Boren
Amendment, previously codified at· §
1396a(a)(13)(A), from the "more flexible"
requirements of §. 30(A). The fact that
Congress
repealed· the
more
rigid
requirements of the Boren Amendment does
not speak to the propriety of our past·
interpretation of § 30(A). Moreover, we
have previously rejected the same argument
made by the Director in this case, noting that
the repeal of the Boren Amendment, "like its
enactment, modified § 13 (A) alone; it
effected no change to § 30(A)."
Finally, the Director urges us to reconsider
our interpretation of § 30(A) in Orthopaedic
Hospital, noting that several courts have
disagreed with its reasoning. Even if we
were at liberty to ovel1'ule Orthopaedic
Hospital, we would nonetheless affirm the
district court's injunction, for several
reasons.

First, even those courts that have rejected
Orthopaedic
Hospital's
procedural
requirements have generally recognized that
state Medicaid rate reductions may not be
based solely on state budgetary concerns. In
this case, the record supports the district
court's conclusion that "the only reason for
imposing the cuts was California's CUl1'ent
fiscal emergency." The legislation was
passed in an emergency session called to
"address[ ] the fiscal emergency declared by
the Governor." Thus, quite apart from any
procedural requirements established by
Orthopaedic Hospital, the State's decision
to reduce Medi-Cal reimbursement rates
based solely on state budgetary concerns
.
violated federal law.
Second, even if we were in a position to
relax
the
procedural
requirements
established in Orthopaedic Hospital, the
Director's failure to study the effect of the
rate reduction in any meaningful way would
still lead us to enjoin implementation of AB
5. Those courts that have criticized
Orthopaedic Hospital's reasoning have not
simply rubber-stamped rate reductions
imposed by state agencies; rathel', reviewing
courts typically subject state rate-making to
something akin to "arbitrary and capricious"
review.
In this case, the State's own Legislative
Analyst warned that the ten percent rate
reduction had "the potential to negatively
impact the operation of the Medi-Cal
Program and the services provided to
beneficiaries by limiting access to providers
and services,'" and on that basis
recommended that the legislature "reject the
Governor's proposal to reduce payments for
all providers except hospitals." Nothing in
the record indicates that any other State
official considered~let .alone studiedthese possibilities prior to enacting the cuts.
Thus, it is far from clear that the Director
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would prevail under a different standard, as
there is no evidence that the agency's
decision-making process was "reasonable
and sound."
Third, those courts that have resisted
interpreting § 3o(A) to include certain
procedural requirements have nonetheless
held that § 3o(A) imposes substantive
obligations on states that elect to participate
in Medicaid. In this case, Independent
Living alleges that at least some medical
providers have refused to treat Medi-Cal
recipients since the ten percent rate
reduction was implemented. Even if we
were to interpret § 30(A) to mandate a
substantive rather than procedural result, the
ten percent rate reduction might still conflict
with the quality of care and .access
provisions of § 30(A), as the cuts have
apparently forced at least some providers to
stop treating Medi -Cal beneficiaries.
The potential difficulties inherent in
assessing substantive compliance with the
factors laid out in § 30(A) demonstrate why
the more process-oriented view of the statute
espoused in Orthopaedic Hospital has much
to recommend it. As Judge Levi stated in
Clayworth v. Bonta"
[Orthopaedic Hospital's] approach
has substantial practical benefits.
The Medicaid Act is clearly intended
to give states discretion and
flexibility in. setting reimbursement
rates, within the limits of federal law.
The arbitrary and capricious standard
limits the court's review of the
State's rate setting and permits the
court to defer to the judgment of
specialists in a complex regulatory
field. Furthermore, it is fair to
assume that a rate that is set
arbitrarily, without reference to the
Section 3o(A) requirements, IS

unlikely to meet the equal access and
quality requirements.
295 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1127 (E.D.Ca1.2003),
rev'd, 140 Fed.Appx. 677 (9th Cir.2005)
(internal citations omitted).
As Judge Levi recognized, the framework
established in Orthopaedic Hospital allows
reviewing courts to defer to a state agency's
balancing of competing interests, so long as
the record created by the agency
demonstrates that the State considered the
factors mandated by statute. In this sense,
the procedural approach is far less intrusive
than the "substantive compliance" stapdard
espoused by the Third and Seventh Circuits.
In sum, the Director has not demonstrated
that Orthopaedic Hospital has been
overruled or undermined in the past twelve
years, and a recent decision of this court
expressly reaffirmed its central holding.
Moreover, even if we were not bound by
Orthopaedic Hospital, there are compelling
reasons to retain Orthopaedic Hospital's
process-oriented focus. The district court
thus correctly applied binding precedent to
Independent Living's claims in this case. Its
conclusion that Independent Living had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits was not an abuse of discretion.
II. Irreparable HanTI
The Director also argues that the district
court committed clear error by holding that
Independent Living had demonstrated a
likelihood of irreparable harm. The bulk of
the Director's argument, however, focuses
on the alleged harm to the State in light of
its current fiscal crisis. The district court
clearly .considered the hardship to the State
but concluded that any such harm was
outweighed by the hardships likely to be
suffered. by Medi-Cal beneficiaries, who
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would be forced to go without medical care.
We have previously held that it is not legal
error to conclude, when balancing "the
medical or financial hardship to [Medi-Cal
recipients] against the financial hardship to
the state," that the balance .of hardships
"tipped sharply" in favor of the plaintiffs,
and we reach the same conclusion in this
case.
The Director argues that whatever harm
Independent Living will suffer if the
injunction is reversed, the State will suffer
more harm if the injunction is upheld. To
suppOli this· argument, the Director cites
Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson for
the proposition that the State will be most
harmed by losing this appeal. See 122 F.3d
718, 719 (9th Cir.1997) (stating, in dicta,
that "it is clear that a state suffers irreparable
injury whenever an enactment of its people
or their representatives is enjoined")[.]
As the cited authority· suggests, a state may
suffer an abstract form of harm whenever
one of its acts is enjoined. To the extent that
is true, however, it is not dispositive of the
balance of harms analysis. If it were, then
the rule requiring "balance" of "competing
claims of injury," would be eviscerated.
Federal courts instead have the power to
enjoin state actions, in part, because those
actions sometimes offend federal law
provisions, which, like state statutes, are
themselves "enactment [s] of its people or
. their representatives[.]" Here, Independent
Living alleges that allowing AB 5's
implementation would violate the Medicaid
Act and the Constitution. If .we uphold the
injunction and interfere with AS 5's
implementation, then we will have
detelmined that to do otherwise would
permit a violation of a federal law which,
like AB 5, was produced by a democratic
process. Therefore, in assessing the relative
harms to the parties, we reject the Director's
suggestion that, merely by enjoining a state

legislative act, we create a per se harm
trumping all other harms.
The Director also challenges the evidence of
irreparable injury provided by certain
Independent Living entities, taking issue
with the gravity of the economic harms
alleged by pharmacists and other medical
to
providers.
The
Director
fails
acknowledge, however, that several of the
entities are Medi-Cal recipients. This court
has previously held that Medi-Cal recipients
may demonstrate a risk of irreparable injury
.by showing that enforcement of a proposed
rule "may deny them needed medical care.".
In this case, the district court carefully
considered the voluminous evidence
presented by the paliies, concluding that
Independent Living had made such a
showing with respect to some medical
services and failed to do so with respect to
others. Aside from restating its own
evidence, the Director does not present any
specific. reason· why the district court's
weighing of Independent Living's evidence
was erroneous. We therefore refuse to.
disturb the district court's factual findings
regarding irreparable injury, which we
review for clear error.
III. Balance of Equities and the Public
Interest
Finally, the Director contends that the
district cOUli erred in its assessment of the
public interest. The public interest analysis
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
requires us to consider "whether. there exists
some critical public interest that would be
injured by the grant of preliminary relief."
The district court held that, although "there
is a public interest in ensuring that the State
has enough money to meet· its financial
obligations," this interest was outweighed by
the public interest "in ensuring access to
health care." The Director argues that, in
light of the State budget crisis, the balance
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of hardships tips in his favor, as the cuts
mandated under AB 5 are necessary to help
reduce the State budget deficit.
We do not doubt the severity of the fiscal
challenges facing the State of Califomia.
State budgetary concems cannot, however,
be "the conclusive factor in decisions
regarding Medicaid." A budget crisis does
not excuse ongoing violations of federal
law, particularly when there are no adequate
remedies available other than an injunction.
State budgetary considerations do not
therefore,. in social welfare cases, constitute
a critical public interest that would be
injured by the grant of preliminary relief. In
contrast, there is a robust public interest in
safeguarding access to health care for those
eligible for Medicaid, whom Congress has
recognized as "the most needy in the
country." We therefore hold that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the balance of hardships and
the public interest weighed in favor of
enjoining implementation of the ten percent
rate reduction required by AB 5.
IV. Sovereign Immunity and the Order
Modifying the Injunction
On cross-appeal, Independent Living
. challenges the district court's August 27,
2008 order modifying its August 18, 2008
order granting Independent Living's motion
for a preliminary injunction. Independent
Living principally argues that, in modifying
the earlier order to eliminate its retroactive
effect, the district court misconstrued the
extent of the State's sovereign immunity.
Independent Living contends that the State
of Califomia has consented to actions in
state court for retroactive awards of
unlawfully withheld funds. Independent
Living further maintains that, by removing
this case to federal court, the Director
waived whatever immunity he had in state

court. The Director responds that the district
court correctly modified the August 18
order. He contends that requiring a state
agency to expend state funds based on past
conduct violates state sovereign immunity,
which, the Director insists, was never
waived in either the state or federal forum.
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity
generally prohibits damage suits against
states in both state and federal court without
their consent. The doctrine comes froni the
Eleventh Amendment, but its essence
"derives . . . from the structure of the
original Constitution itself."
The Supreme Court has held that state
sovereign immunity bars citizens of any
state from bringing a lawsuit for damages
against a state or state agency. However,
there are three well-established exceptions
to this general rule. Two of them-Ex parte
Young and state waiver (both explicit
consent and implied removal waiver)-are
relevant here, and we consider them below.
A. The Order's Validity Under Ex parte
Young

Although the Eleventh Amendment
expressly prohibits suits against states in
both law and equity, a plaintiff may
nonetheless maintain a federal action to
compel a state official's prospective
compliance with the plaintiff s federal
rights. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156,
28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); id. at
160, 28 S.Ct. 441 ("The State has no power
to impart to [its officer] any immunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the
United States.")[.] The court may order such
an injunction even if the state's compliance
will have an "ancillary effect" on the state
treasury. This exception applies only to
prospective relief; it does not permit
retroactive injunctive relief.
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In this case, the August 18 order constituted
retroactive relief under our controlling
precedent. In Native Village of Noatak v.
Blatchford, we held that, "[i]n requesting an
order requmng the Commissioner to
perform his 'legal duty' to disburse . . .
funds" to him, the plaintiff "essentially
seeks an injunction directing the state to pay
damages." 38 F.3d 1505, 1512 (9th
Cir.1994). What the plaintiff sought, we
held, was "precisely the type of retroactive
relief that the Supreme Court refused to
allow in Edelman, " and therefore his
"attempt to characterize its claim as one for
prospective relief fail [ed] to avoid the bar of
the Eleventh Amendment."

removed the case, sovereign immunity will
not protect him if the State has previously
consented to suits like this one in state court.

In this matter, the August 18 order provided
retroactive relief that required the State to
pay monetary compensation to affected
providers. Therefore, under Native Village
of Noatak, the retroactive portion of that
order does not fall under the Ex parte Young
exception to the sovereign immunity
doctrine. As a result, the order violated the
State's sovereign immunity unless the
Director waived that immunity-impliedly
through removal, explicitly through consent
to suit in state court, or. through some
combination thereof-an issue we now
consider.

Though it does not explicitly waive
sovereign immunity against retroactive
disbursements, this provision can be read to
sanction
judicially
ordered
fund
disbursements generally.

B. The State's
Immunity

Waiver

of Sovereign

Even if a plaintiff seeks damages for past
conduct, sovereign immunity will not
insulate a state from suit in state court,
provided the state has previously consented
to be sued in state court under like
circumstances. While a state's consent to .
suit in its own courts does not waive
sovereign immunity against suit in federal
court, a state that consents to suit in state
court cannot invoke the sovereign immunity
defense after removing the suit to federal
court[.] As a result, given that the Director

Here, Independent Living points to several
state authorities it claims constitute such
consent. First, it notes that California Code
of Civil Procedure § 1085 provides:
A writ of mandate may be issued by
any court to any inferior tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, to
compel the performance of an act
which the law specially enjoins, as a
duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station.

California state courts, some interpreting
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1085,
have condoned such orders in more explicit
terms. Various decisions have interpreted
state law to permit mandamus actions
of unlawfully
seeking
disbursement
withheld funds. Notably, some of these
cases have specifically recognized the
availability of monetary awards against a
state agency or official resulting from
unlawfully withheld health and welfare
payments. In Los Angeles County v. Riley,
the cOUli authorized back payments for
needy services against the State and noted
that "[t]he rule is well established in this
state that where the action is one simply to
compel . an officer to perform a duty
expressly enjoined upon him by law, it may
. not be considered a suit against the state."
128 P.2d at 543 (citing, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of
Woman's Relief C01pS Home Ass 'n of Cal.
v. Nye, 8 Cal.App. 527, 97 P. 208
(Cal.Ct.App.1908))[.]
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Thus, California has construed the scope of
its sovereign immunity as it relates to
awards of unlawfully withheld funds more
narrowly than have the federal courts. Under
California law, an action seeking injunctive
relief that requires a state official to disburse
funds is not an action against the State.
Thus, it does not implicate the State's
sovereign immunity against liability in its·
own courts. Had this action remained in
state cOUli, the Director would not have
enjoyed sovereign immunity against a order
directing payment of retroactive benefits.
Under our precedent, because the Director
enjoyed no sovereign immunity in state
cOUli against a order directing payment of
retroactive benefits, it follows that the
Director-by removing the case to federal
court-.waived sovereign immunity in that
forum as well. See Embury, 361 F.3d at 566
(citing Lapides v. Board of Regents, 535
U.S. 613, 623-24, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152
L.Ed.2d 806 . (2002)) (holding that, in
removing a case to federal court, a state
defendant waives its Eleventh Amendment
immunity}; see also Stewart, 393 F.3d at
488. Embury's rule is grounded on the
Supreme COUli's holding in Lapides, which
held that where a state removed a state law
defamation action to federal cOUli, it waived
its sovereign immunity against the state
claim. Embury extended Lapides's principle
to federal claims. Under Embury, the
Director, having waived state court
immunity, also waived federal court
sovereign immunity by voluntarily removing
the action. Because the Director lacked
sovereign immunity against retroactive
orders, the district court's August 18 order
should have applied retroactively. As a
result, by basing its order on an en'oneous .
legal standard, the district court erred in
eliminating the injunction's retroactive
effect. We hold that the district court's
injunction should extend to all services

covered by that injunction and provided on
or after July 1,2008.
C. Other Claims of Error Regarding the
August 27, 2008 Order
Independent Living also contends that the
district court's August 27,' 2008 order
violated their right to due process, namely,
their property right in the jUdgment reflected
in the cOUli's August 18, 2008 order. They
. also allege that, in modifying the August 18
order, the district court abused its discretion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).
Based on our conclusion that the August 27,
2008 order erroneously construed the State's
sovereign immunity, we do not reach these
claims.
CONCLUSION
The district cOUli properly applied this
court's prior decision in Orthopaedic
Hospital to hold that Independeht Living has
. demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits. Moreover, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the
balance of hardships tips sharply in
Independent Living's favor, as the ten
percent rate reduction threatens access to
much-n~eded medical care. We therefore
affirm the. district cOUli's order granting in
part Independent Living's motion for a
preliminary injunction.
However, the district court's subsequent
order modifying the injunction to apply only
to payments for services provided on or after
August 18 was based on an erroneous legal
standard. The State of California has waived
its sovereign immunity against mandamus
actions
in
state
courts
seeking
reimbursement of unlawfully withheld
funds, and the Director, by voluntarily
removing this case to federal court, waived
the State's sovereign immunity in federal
cOUli. We therefore reverse the district
60

court's August 18 order modifying the
injunction and remand to the district court
for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part,
and REMANDED.
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"V.S. Supreme Court to Decide If California Can Cut
Payments to Medi-Cal Providers"
Los Angeles Times
January 19, 2011
David G. Savage & Shane Goldmacher

The U.S. Supreme. Court announced
Tuesday that it will decide 'whether to give
California and other cash-strapped states
more freedom to cut the amounts they pay
doctors" hospitals and other providers of
medical care for the poor.
The case could have a major impact on Gov.
Jerry Brown's plans to close the state's
massive budget deficit.
Federal courts previously blocked about $1
billion in Medi-Cal cutbacks adopted by the
Legislature in 2008. Brown has proposed
trying those cuts again. His budget plan
would reduce the amounts the state pays
healthcare providers by 10%, which would
reduce the program by $719 million.
Many other states have indicated an interest
in making similar cutbacks. Twenty-two
states joined California in its appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Attempts in California to trim spending on
Medi-Cal and other health programs have
repeatedly been tied up in the courts. Former
Gov.
Arnold
Schwarzenegger
once
criticized federal judges for "going
absolutely crazy" in their continued
blockage of attempted spending reductions.
Brown spokeswoman Elizabeth Ashford
said the federal courts had been a
"roadblock" in allowing California to
balance its budget. The issue before the high
court, she said, was a matter of "state
sovereignty. "

"It's incredibly important," she said of the
high comt's decision to consider the case.
"The fact that they are taking this up
indicates that they understand how
important this issue is to the state."
But medical groups said the state's plans
would essentially deny healthcare coverage
to hundreds of thousands of people by
driving doctors from the program.
CUlTently, 57% of California doctors accept
new Medi-Cal patients, according to a study
published last year by the California
HealthCareFoundation. That number would
drop further if the state reimburses doctors
less, said Anthony Wright, executive
director of Health Access, a consumer
advocacy group.
About seven million Californians get their
health coverage through Medi-Cal.
"The practical effect" of the state's cutbacks
"is that it makes it harder for the millions of
Californians on Med-Cal to get in to see a
doctor," Wright said.
The California Medical Assn., which
represents 35,000 doctors, called the state's
existing
Medi-Cal
payment
rates
"ridiculously low-.among the lowest in the
nation."
Cutting them further "would only serve to
force more doctors out of the program and
decrease access to care for millions of poor
Californians/' the
and unemployed
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association's president, James Hinsdale, said
in a statement. "Regardless of the legal
issues involved, slashing Medi-Cal rates is
bad public policy that would undermine the
state's healthcare system."
The program of healthcare for the poor,
known as Medicaid nationally and Medi-Cal
in California, is funded jointly by the federal
government and the states. The law is
unclear on how far states can go to reduce
the amount they pay to providers.
After California's cutbacks in 2008, doctors,
hospitals, pharmacies and other providers
sued in federal court. They argued
successfully that the cutbacks were so steep
that poor patients would no longer have
access to acceptable healthcare and that the
cuts were preempted by the federal
Medicaid Act.
But lawyers for then-Atty. Gen. Brown
appealed to the Supreme Court. They argued

that private parties,such as doctors, had no
right to sue the state and no dght to a
particular reimbursement payment.
This appeal touched a chord in the high
court. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.,
among others, has been skeptical of the
notion that when the federal government
provides public money for ben~fits such as
health or education, federal law authorizes
suits by those unhappy with the level of
spending.
The Obama administration so far has sided
against the state. In December, the Justice
Department told the high court it should turn
down California's appeal.
Instead, the justices agreed to hear three
separate appeals from the state, all of which
raise the same issue. The lead case IS
Maxwell-Jolly vs. Independent Living
Center of So utlt em Califomia.
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"The Other Healthcare Lawsuit: California Medicaid
(aIm Medi-CaI) Case Headed to Supreme Court"
Los Angeles Times

June 6, 2011
Marilyn Chase
With valet parking for pat!ents, videoconferencing for parents of premature babies
and a healing garden abloom with azaleas,
Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital tries to
maintain the amenities of a thriving
community hospital.
But chief financial officer Mich Riccioni is
focused on the fiscal strains Memorial is
facing. Nearly a quarter of the hospital's
patients are on California's Medicaid
program, known as Medi-Cal, and the state
has been trying for years to cut its
reimbursement rates for hospitals and other
healthcare providers.
Memorial, a 278-bed hospital in this city 55
miles north of San Francisco, sued
California to try to stop the payment
reductions. Now it is part of a case before
the U.S. Supreme Court that could redefine
states' responsibilities on Medicaid services
and
ultimately
determine
whether
Democratic Gov. Jeny Brown can go
forward with cuts he says are vital to closing
the state's budget gap. The court is likely to
hear arguments in the fall and render a
decision by next spring.
Many states are pressing for more flexibility
on Medicaid, a joint federal-state health
program for the poor and disabled. But
Memorial, as well as other hospitals and
doctors, counter that the steep cuts violate
federal law, which requires that payments be
set high enough to ensure providers will see
enrollees.
They
note
the
state's
reimbursement rates rank 46th among the
states.

Obama administration recently
The
proposed a rule that would require states to
consider the impact of payment cuts and to
perform reviews to see if patients are getting
necessary services.
In 2008, California targeted its Medicaid
program, which today has an annual budget
of $42 billion. The legislature and
Republican Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger
approved a 10 percent cut in payments to
providers.
Riccioni estimated that the proposal would
reduce Memorial's revenue by $17.5 million
over three years. The hospital, officials say,
already is struggling financially. Memorial
has slashed 180 jobs, imposed a one-year
salary freeze, closed its inpatient psychiatric
ward and its skilled nursing facility and
canceled a planned $260 million' surgery
tower.
Supreme Court focus

In the legal battle over reimbursement cuts,
the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
against the state in several cases. In January,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case
based on Memorial's suit and two others.
The court will focus on whether outside
groups, such as hospitals and other
providers, as well as Medicaid recipients,
have the right to sue when they believe the
state is violating federal law. For now the
state-baned by the 9th Circuit injunctionis holding off on the disputed cuts at issue in
the lawsuit.
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"This is an extremely important case," said
Charles Luband, a partner with the law firm
Ropes & Gray LLP in New York City,
which has drafted letters in support of
hospitals and doctors in the case. "The
Medicaid statute was created to assure
payments were sufficient to enlist enough
providers to participate in the program.
That's why it's important providers be able
to bring such lawsuits to assure that statute
has meaning and relevance."
Sara Rosenbaum, chairwoman of the
Department of Health Policy at George
Washington University, said the case could
have broad ramifications for patients. If
Califomia wins, Medicaid recipients
wouldn't be able to sue states to compel
them to fulfill an array of duties under the
law, such as conducting "fair hearings" for
emollees deemed ineligible, she said.
But 22 states, in an amicus brief, asserted
that they must be able to control their own
Medicaid spending and that a ruling against
Califomia would open a spigot of suits from
health care providers.
"To allow private litigants to bring such
actions would devastate amICI States'
financing ability to provide assistance to its
ever-growing lower income citizens in the
current economiC climate," the states said.
The Obama administration is backing the
states up. In an amicus brief that angered
consumer advocates, the Justice Department
said that Medicaid patients and providers
can't sue state officials to block payment. It
argued that allowing such suits could lead to
"a plethora of private action~ threatening
disparate outcomes." Federal health officials
should decide when cuts go too far, the brief
said.
The court isn't expected to rule on whether
the proposed provider cuts are legal. If the

providers win in the Supreme Court, that
issue would likely be sent back to the 9th
Circuit. Also, the administration's proposed
Medicaid rule on payment cuts isn't likely to
have much impact; the Supreme Court will
be considering the narrow issue of whether
private parties have standing to sue states
over alleged violations of the Medicaid law.
'Within its means'

Medi-Cal-the largest chunk of California
general fund expenditures after educationcovers 7.5 million people and is growmg,
according to state officials.
Brown and the legislature agreed on a
budget that would cut rates by 10 percent for
Medi-Cal providers like Memorial that don't
have· contracts with the state and up to 5
percent for providers such as doctors.
Officials estimate it would save California
$567 million this year.
"These are not choices we'd make in
environment,"
said
health
another
department spokesman Norman Williams.
"But California must live within its means."
One of the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court
case is Norma Jean Vescovo, founder of the
Van Nuys-based Independent Living Center
of Southern California serving about 6,000
disabled clients a year. She says her clients
have trouble finding doctors and druggists
who will accept Medi-Cal' s reduced rates.
"We've had diabetic patients who couldn't
get their medications," Vescovo said.
"When you look around,You see pharmacies
closing."
.
"They want to pay me 10 percent below my
costs," said Gary A vnet, owner of Sayre
Medical Pharmacy in Southern California.
"What do I do?" Selling pricey drugs for
diabetes and HIV below cost means, "I'd be
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out of business," he said.
In downtown Los Angeles, Jerry Shapiro
runs Uptown Drug and Gift Shoppe, a store
his father opened on VJ Day in 1945.
Shapiro said he breaks even on drugs
costing up to $124, but loses money filling
costlier prescriptions for serious conditions
. such as cancer or multiple sclerosis. "I'm
having a very tough time," he said. "I

borrowed a lot of money to stay in
business."
While big box stores can better absorb cuts,
small pharmacies .that offer services like
delivery and patient· counseling· are hurt
more by the reductions, Shapiro said; "I had
my house completely paid for and now I'm
in hock for more than I ever had a mortgage .
for," he said.
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"State Can't Cut Medi-Cal Payments to Hospitals"
San Francisco Chronicle

March 4,2010
. Bob Egelko
A federal appeals court barred California on
Wednesday from lowering Medi-Cal
payments to doctors and hospitals by 5
percent and from cutting in-home care
workers' wages by nearly 20 percent, saying
the state's budget crisis doesn't justify
violating federal laws that protect the poor
and disabled.
In four rulings, the Ninth U.S. Circuit COUli
of Appeals in San Francisco rejected
attempts by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger
and the Legislature to reduce the state's
deficit by paying less to the health
professionals who treat 6.6 million lowincome Californians, and to hundreds of
thousands of workers who care for some of
the neediest.
The reductions would have totaled at least
$175 million a year, according to estimates
by the state and employee groups. But the
court said the federal government-which
pays at least half of each program's costsrequires states to maintain poor residents'
equal access to basic health care, and forbids
cuts intended solely to save money.
Previous rulings had reached the same
conclusion,
including
one
that
Schwarzenegger tried to get the U.S.
Supreme COUli to review.
Federal law doesn't prohibit Medi-Cal
reductions, Judge Milan Smith said in one of
Wednesday's decisions, all issued. by the
same three-judge panel. But he said the state
must first conduct a study to make sure that
the rates cover reasonable costs of care.

The rulings reaffirm that "the state. cannot
solve its budget problems on the backs of
some of the most vulnerable Californians,"
said Stacey Leyton, a lawyer for unions
representing workers in the In-Home
Supportive Services program, which serves
440,000 people.
Likewise, cutting Medi-Cal rates-already
among the nation's lowest-for doctors and
other health care providers is both illegal
and harmful to the providers and their
patients, said Lloyd Boolamin, attorney for
the California Hospital Association and
adult day health care centers.
Schwarzenegger
was
unyielding.
Spokeswoman Rachel Arrezola noted that
the governor has another appeal pending
with the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that
the appeals court has misinterpreted the
federal health-care law for more than a
decade.
Wednesday's court action "interferes with
the state's ability to manage its finances and
reduce its spending to match its revenue,"
Arrezola said.
The governor and the Legislature first tried
to cut Medi-Cal provider payments by 10
. percent in July 2008, then enacted a 5
percent reduction in February 2009, but
were thwarted by the courts.
A federal judge also blocked the state in
June 2009 from reducing in-home care
workers' wages by $2 an hour. Most of the
workers now.get $12.10 an hour, including
benefits.
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Workers provide care for low-income
residents who are over 65, or are disabled or
blind, and need help with everyday living
tasks. Schwarzenegger has proposed
abolishing the program in his 2010-11
. budget unless the federal government
increases state aid.
Leyton, who represents. the Service
Employees Intemational Union's home-care
workers unit, said the funding cuts would
actually drive up state costs, because many
patients would be forced into nursing homes
or hospitals.

At a union-sponsored news conference,
Mary Harms, a home-care worker in Contra
Costa County, described the likely effect of
program cuts on her 53-year-old client,
ShelTY, who suffers from cerebral palsy and
mental retardation.
Harms said the services she has provided for
ShelTY foi' seven years, helping her get out
of bed and bathing her, allow her to stay at
home with her loved ones. "Without home
care, ShelTY would be institutionalized," she
said. "She would just lay in bed and
eventually die."
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"Federal Court Rules Against California
Medicaid Cuts"
NYAPRS
March 5, 2010
Tom Gilroy, BNA

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reiterated March 3 its oft-stated
opinion that California may not cut its MediCal reimbursement rates purely for
budgetary reasons, but instead must rely on
responsible cost studies, prior to any cuts, to
show that the planned reductions. do not
reduce access to care for Medicaid recipients
(California Pharmacists Assn. v. MaxwellJolly, 9th Cir., No. 09-55532,3/3/10).
The ruling, affirming a preliminary
injunction granted by a federal district cOUli
. judge in February 2009 against a planned 5
percent rate cut voted by the Legislature in
September 2008 (A.B. 1183), again relied
heavily on the Ninth Circuit's 1997 decision
in Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe, 103 F.3d
1491. In Orthopaedic, the court held that
Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act requires
that payments for Medi-Cal services "must
be sufficient to enlist enough providers to
provide access to Medicaid recipients."
.That, in turn, required that the Department
of Health Services, the predecessor agency
to the current Department of Health Care
Services (DHCS), "must rely on responsible
cost studies, its own or others,' that provide
reliable data as a basis for its rate setting."
Judge C1n'istina A. Snyder of the U.S.
District COUli for the Central District of
California had granted a preliminary
1183
injunction against the
A.B.
. reimbursement cuts. Snyder cited the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Orthopaedic, and said a
DHCS analysis. supporting the rate

reductions was completed well after
. enactment of the law, and thus did not meet
the requirements set out in Orthopaedic.
The challenge to the rate cuts was brought
by a· group of adult day health care centers
(ADHCs), hospitals, pharmacies, and other
beneficiaries of the state's Medicaid
program, known as Medi-Cal. It was similar
to a lawsuit filed in 2008 by other providers
protesting a 10 percent Medi-Cal rate cut,
which Snyder also blocked, and the Ninth
Circuit upheld (Independent Living Center
of Southern California v. Shewry, C.D. Cal.,
No. CV 08-3315 CAS (MANx), preliminary
injunction grated 8/18/08) (162 HCDR,
8/21108).
More recently, Snyder on Feb. 24 granted,
on virtually identical grounds as the other
cases, a preliminary injunction sought by the
California Hospital Association, against
state legislation (A.B. 5) that effectively
freezes certain designated hospital services
at 2008-2009 levels .
Rejecting State's Argument

In its appeal of the adult day care centers'
preliminary injunction, the state argued that
Orthopaedic did not hold that rate-setting
had to be based upon pre-enactment
legislative studies undeliaken and completed
by the Legislature itself prior to the action
authorizing implementation of the cuts. That
case focused solely on thedepmiment's
actions, and thus only the department was
required to consider Section 3o(A)
requirements, the state maintained.
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But the Ninth Circuit three-judge panel
disagreed. The court in Orthopaedic did, in
fact, focus on the department, since it was
. setting the rates . in that instance.
Nevertheless, the state is "misguided" in
thinking that focus "absolves the legislature
of the same requirements when it sets rates,"
Judge Milan D. Smith Jr., who wrote the
OpInIOn, stated. In Orthopaedic, the
Legislature was "one step removed from the
regulations
promulgated
by
the
Department," and thus the Ninth Circuit had
no reason to focus on what that body
considered before rates were set, Smith
noted. "Yet if the legislature elects to bypass
the Department, and set rates itself, it must
engage in the same principled analysis we
required of the Director in Orthopaedic II,"
he added, "In sum, we find nothing
remarkable in holding that the final body
responsible
for
setting
Medicaid
reimbursement rates must study the impact
. of the contemplated rate reduction on the
statutory factors of efficiency, economy,
quality of care, and access to care prior to
setting or adjusting payment rates," the court
wrote. The appellate court also agreed with
Snyder that the DHCS's post hoc analysis of
the rate cuts did not satisfy the requirements
of Orthopaedic. "To satisfy Section 30(A),
any analysis of reimbursement rates on the
statutory factors of efficiency, economy,
quality, and access to care must have the
potential to influence the rate-setting
process," the court ruled.
Yet the DHCS analysis of AB. 1183 with
regard to adult day care centers was issued
more than five months after enactment of
the law, it noted. While that was still before
the cuts were actually implemented, the
Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by the
DHCS's argument that the director could
have vetoed the cuts if he determined they
did not comply with Section 30(A).

Finally, the appellate court rejected the
state's claim that the lower court erred when
it found that plaintiffs demonstrated a
likelihood of irreparable harm if the
preliminary injunction was not granted. In
fact, showing a procedural violation of the
statute, n~ely the state's failure to consider
the impact of the rate cuts on the statutory
factors set forth in Section 30(A), may
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits that the setting of provider
reimbursement rates conflict with Section
30(A), the cOUli stated.
If at least some providers stop treating
Medi-Cal beneficiaries as a result of the rate
cuts, and evidence indicates that at least.
some adult day care center providers would
stop treating beneficiaries due to AB. 1183,
that might be sufficient for a finding of.
irreparable harm~ Smith wrote.
"We have now handed down multiple
decisions instructing the State on. Section
30(A)'s procedural requirements," Smith
noted in the court's conclusion. "We trust
that the State now understands that in order
for it to comply with Section· 30(A)'s
'requirement that payments for services
must be consistent with efficiency,
economy, and quality of care, and sufficient
to ensure access,' . . . it must: 1) 'rely on
responsible cost studies, its own or others,'
that provide reliable data as a basis for its
rate setting,' ... and 2) study the impact of
contemplated rate change(s) on the statutOlY
factors prior to setting rates, or in a manner
that allows those studies to have a
meaningful impact on rates before they are
finalized," he added. Because the state did
neither with regard to AB. 1183, the district
court's order
granting plaintiffs a
preliminary injunction was affirmed, Smith
added.

***
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"Healthcare Programs May End: Governor's Revised
Budget Is Expected to Call for Axing Some He
Couldn't Scale Back"
Los Angeles Times

May 13,2010
Evan Halper
Gov. Arnold Schwarzeneggeris expected to
present a revised budget plan Friday that
would dismantle some of California's
landmark healthcare programs after efforts
to scale them back have been reversed by
federal courts.
The rulings, issued mostly over the last two
years, have already forced the state to
unwind roughly $2.4 billion in cuts
approved by the governor and Legislature
and have alarmed other financially strapped
states seeking ways to balance their budgets.
Schwal'zenegger has lashed out at the federal
judges, saying they've been "going
absolutely crazy" and accusing them of
interfering with the state's ability to get its
finances in order.
The rulings tie their hands, administration
officials say, and they are asking the u.s.
Supreme .Court to intervene in a petition
supported by 22 other states.
"We can't make any changes to these
programs," said Susan Kennedy, the
governor's chief of staff. "Anybody can just
walk into a courthouse and freeze them."
Administration officials declined to reveal
which specific programs the governor would
eliminate. But officials involved in the
budget. process, who spoke on condition of
anonymity because they are not authorized
to speak publicly, said they would probably
include home healthcare for the elderly and
disabled, a nearly $2-billion program that
serves 440,000 Californians. Cuts that

lawmakers and the governor made to the
program' in an effort to balance the budget
have been blocked by legal rulings over the
last year.
.
The court decisions restrict their ability to
make cuts in the programs, officials said, but
they don't preclude dismantling them.
Abolishing home healthcare services would
mean forfeiting the federal Medicaid money
that helps fund them. But the money comes
with requirements that the courts said
California did not meet. The state would not
have to follow the requirements if it did
away with the program, and thus would no
longer risk having its financial plans
upended in court.
The Schwarzenegger administration may
also propose the dismantling of the Healthy
Families program, which uses federal money
to help provide health insurance for about
900,000
low-income
children.
The
administration warned in January that it
would try to abolish the program if the
state's budget situation did not improve------'which it has not. The deficit remains swollen
at $18.6 billion, or roughly 20% of general
fund spending.
"It is a tenible situation," said Sara
Rosenbaum, a professor of health policy and
law at George WashingtOli University in
Washington, D.C. "If you take the federal
money, there is an obligation to comply with
the rules .... But it has reached this extreme
in California where the state is saying, 'We
just won't run the program.'"
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The other states .have signed on to
California's effort at the U.S. Supreme
Court because they fear precedents set by
the California rulings in the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeal expose them to similar
litigation.
The Supreme Court is expected to decide
next month whether to heal' the case.
"Michigan shares California's concerns,"
said Tiffany Brown, a spokeswoman for
Michigan Gov. Jennifer Granholm. Officials
there are concerned that their ability to
administer Medicaid funds has become
"hindered," Brown said.
Washington State IS also supporting
California's legal battle. Federal cOUlis
recently unraveled cuts there affecting
payments to pharmacies and nursing homes.
"The inability to take prompt action to
reduce payment rates to providers has
caused a problem," said Bill Stephens, an
assistant attorney general in Washington.

Schwarzenegger's proposals, meanwhile,
would face stiff opposition in the
Legislature, where there is limited support
for taking apali the state's healthcare
system.
pi'oviders and advocacy groups that have
successfully sued the state to block the
previous cuts are also working with the
Democrats who control the Legislature to
preserve services.
"The state is . . . rushing to make budget
decisions without doing due diligence to
follow the federal standal'ds," said Andrew
LaMar, spokesman for the California
Medical Assn., which represents 35,000
California physicians and has sued to block
cuts in reimbursements to doctors.
Anthony Wright, executive director of
Health Access, a consumer advocacy group,
said that even before the latest round of
cutbacks, California paid its doctors and
other Medicaid providers among the lowest
.
rates in the nation.

The court fight raises new questions about
the viability of the national healthcare
overhaul signed into law by President
Obama earlier this year.

More cuts to Medi-Cal, California's
Medicaid program, would undermine it, he
said.

The federal legislation assumes a substantial
expansion of the costly Medicaid programs
that officials in California and elsewhere are
proposing to abandon.

"If you further cut provider rates, you
potentially make it that Californians with
Medi-Cal simply will have no doctor,"
Wright said. "If the· state wants federal
matching funds for the programs, they need
to keep their end of the bargain."

72

"Administration Opposes Challenges
to Medicaid Cuts"
New York Times
May 28,2011·
Robert Pear

Medicaid recipients and health care
providers cannot sue state officials to·
challenge cuts in Medicaid payments, even
if such cuts compromise access to health
care for poor people, the Obama
administration has told the Supreme Court.
States around the country, faced with severe
budget problems, have been reducing
Medicaid rates for· doctors, dentists,
hospitals, pharmacies, nursing homes and
other providers.
Federal law says Medicaid rates must be
"sufficient to enlist enough providers" so
that Medicaid recipients have access to care
to the same extent as the general population
In an area.
In a friend-of-the court brief filed Thursday
in the Supreme Court, the Justice
Department said that no federal law allowed
private individuals to sue states to enforce
this standard.
Such lawsuits "would not be compatible"
with the means of enforcement envisioned
by Congress, which relies on the secretary of
health and human services to make sure
states comply, the administration said in the
brief, by the acting solicitor general, Neal K.
Katyal.

health officials are better equipped than
judges to balance that goal with other policy
objectives, like holding down costs.
The administration expressed its views in a
set of cases consolidated under the name
Douglas v. Independent· Living Center of
Southem California, No. 09-958.
In 2008 and 2009, the California Legislature
passed several laws reducing Medicaid
payment rates. Recipients and providers
challenged the cuts in court, arguing that the
California plan violated-and was preempted by-the federal Medicaid statute.
The law does not explicitly allow such
lawsuits. But the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San
Francisco, said beneficiaries and providers
could sue under the supremacy clause of the
Constitution, which makes federal law "the
supreme law of the land." In reducing
payment rates, the appeals court said,
California violated the requirements of
federal Medicaid law and threatened access
to "much-needed medical care."
California appealed to the Supreme Court,
which is likely to hear oral arguments in the
fall, with a decision by next spring.

In many parts of the country, payment rates
are so low that Medicaid recipients have
difficulty finding doctors to take them.

Consumer advocates were dismayed by the
administration's position, which they said
undermin,ed Medicaid recipients' rights and
access to the courts.

But, the Justice Department said, the
Medicaid law's promise of equal access to
care is· "broad and nonspecific," and federal

"I find it appalling that the solicitor general
in a Democratic administration would assert
in a Supreme Court brief that businesses can
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challenge state regulation under the
supremacy clause, but that poor recipients of
Medicaid cannot challenge state violations
of federal law," said Prof. Timothy S. Jost,
an expert on health law at Washington and
Lee University, who is usually sympathetic
to the administration.
.
Representative Henry A. Waxman of
California, the senior Democrat on the
Energy and Commerce Committee and an
. architect
of
Medicaid,
said
the
administration's brief was "wrong on the
law and bad policy."
"I am bitterly disappointed that President
Obama would accept the position of the
. acting solicitor general to file a brief that is
contrary to the decades-long practice of
giving Medicaid beneficiaries and providers
the ability to tum to the courts to enforce
their rights under federal law," Mr. Waxman
said. He said that he and other Democratic
lawmakers planned to file a brief opposing

the administration's view.
By contrast, many state officials agree with
California and the Obama administration.
The National Governors Association and the
National Conference of State Legislatures
filed a friend-of-the-court brief endorsing
California's
position
that
Medicaid
recipients and providers could not sue.
In a separate friend-of-the-court brief,
Michigan and 30 other states went further.
"Allowing 'supremacy clause lawsuits' to
enforce federal Medicaid laws will be a
financial catastrophe for states," they said.
Medicaid is financed jointly by the federal
government and the states. The number of
recipients and the costs increased sharply in
the recent recession and will increase further
with the expected addition of 16 million
people to the rolls under the new federal
health care law.
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Coleman v. Maryland Court ofAppeals
10-1016

Ruling Below: Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2010) cert.
granted, 10-1016,2011 WL 500227 (U.S. June 27,2011).
Petitioner Daniel Coleman, an African-American male, received a letter of reprimand in 2007
from one of his supervisors at the Maryland Court of Appeals concerning a communications
protocol. Coleman unsuccessfully appealed this reprimand. A few months later, Coleman applied
for sick leave based upon a documented medical condition. His supervisor informed him the next
day that he would be terminated if he did not resign.
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Coleman brought a Title VII and FMLA claim
alleged that he was fired for requesting sick-leave, and because of his race. Coleman claims an
earlier false contract-steering charge against him was also a factor. That charge was brought in
retaliation for Coleman's investigation and suspension of one of his staff members in 2005.
The district court dismissed Coleman's FMLA claim on the basis that it was baned by Eleventh
Amendment immunity. That court concluded Congress had unconstitutionally abrogated the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the FMLA's self-care provision. The
Fourth circuit affirmed the lower court, holding that when enacted, the self-care provision of the
FMLA was not targeted at preventing discrimination and thus does not pass the congruence-andproportionality test for valid Congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
Question Presented: Whether Congress constitutionally abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it passed the self-care leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act.
Daniel COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS; Frank Broccolina, State Court Administrator;
Larry Jones, Contract Administrator, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided November 10,2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
TRAXLER, Chief Judge:
Daniel Coleman appeals the dismissal of his
amended complaint in this suit alleging, as is
relevant here, violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), see
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West
2003 & Supp.20 10), and of the Family and

Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), see
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-54 (West 2009 &
Supp.2010). Finding no enOl', we affilm.
1.
Coleman's Title VII claim was dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can
75

be granted. In reviewing such a dismissal,
we accept the facts alleged in the complaint
as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Viewed through
that lens, the facts for purposes of this
appeal are as follows.
Coleman, an African-American male, was
employed by the Maryland Court of Appeals
from March 2001 to August 2007 and
served as executive director of procurement
and contract administration since early 2003.
Coleman was supervised by Frank
Broccolina, a white male, and Faye Gaskins,
whose race is not specified. Larry Jqnes,
whose race also is not specified, was a
member of Coleman's staff and was related
to Gaskins. In October 2005, Coleman
investigated a matter involving Jones and
Joyce Shue, a white female. Coleman's
investigation "resulted in a five (5) day
suspension" for Jones. After Broccolina and
Gaskins intervened, however, Jones's
suspension was reduced to only one day. In
retaliation for Coleman's investigation,
Jones' falsely alleged that Coleman had
steered contracts to vendors in which
Coleman had an interest, and Jones
encouraged Broccolina to investigate.
Broccolina, in tum, shared the allegations
. with others despite knowing that they were
false.
During his employment, Coleman satisfied
the performance standards of his position
and received all applicable "raises and
increments." However, in early April 2007,
he received a letter of reprimand from
Gaskins concerning "a communication
protocol." Coleman's appeal of the
reprimand was unsuccessful. Then, on
August 2, 2007, Coleman sent Broccolina a
sick-leave request "based upon a
documented medical condition." Broccolina
contacted Coleman the next day and
informed him that he would be terminated if
he did not resign. Coleman alleges that he

was fired for requesting sick leave and
because he is black. He also al1eges that the
contract-steering charge played a role in his
termination.
After
exhausting
his
administrative
remedies, Coleman initiated the present
action. The complaint before us names
Broccolina, Jones, and the Maryland Court
of Appeals as defendants and alleges
violations of Title VII and the FMLA. On
defendants' motion, the district court
dismissed the Title VII claim on the grounds
that Coleman failed to state a claim for
which relief could be granted, see
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and' dismissed the
FMLA claim on the basis that it was barred
by Eleventh Amendment immunity, see
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
II.
Arguing that the complaint properly alleged
both a claim for disparate treatment and a
claim for retaliation, Coleman maintains that
the district court erred in dismissing his Title
VII cause of action. We disagree.
We review de novo the grant of a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). When ruling
on such a motion, "a judge must accept as
true all of the factual allegations contained
in the complaint." A complaint "need only
give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests." However, to survive a motion to
dismiss, the complaint must "state[ ] a
plausible claim for relief" that "permit[s] the
court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct" based upon "its judicial
experience and common sense." In this
regard, while a plaintiff is not required to
plead facts that constitute a prima facie case
in order to survive a motion to dismiss,
"[fJactual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level[.]"
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Title VII prohibits an .employer from
"discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise .
. . discriminat[ing] against any hidividual
with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race." Absent
direct evidence, the elements of a prima
facie case of discrimination under Title VII
are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2)
satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse
employment action; and (4) different
treatment from similarly situated employees
outside the protected class. Title VII also
prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing]
against any of [their] employees ... because
[the employees] ha[ve] opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by
[Title VII], or because [the employees]
ha[ve] . . . participated in any manner in an
investigation" under Title VII. The elements
of a prima' facie retaliation claim under Title
VII are: (1) engagement in a protected
activity; (2) adverse employment action; and
(3) a causal link between the protected
activity and the employment action.

any impropriety was comparable to the acts
Coleman was alleged to have committed. '
Absent such, support, the complaint's
allegations of race discrimination do not rise
above speculation. Thus, the district court
correctly concluded that the complaint failed
to state a Title VII race discrimination claim.
See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 ("Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mereconclusory statements,
do not suffice.").
The district court also correctly ruled that
Coleman failed to state a Title VII
retaliation claim. No facts in the complaint
identify any protected activity by Coleman
that prompted the retaliation of which he
complains. Coleman maintains that his
protected activity was his intervention in the
conflict between Jones and Shue. However,
the complaint does not explain why
Coleman's
investigation
would
be
considered protected activity. We therefore
affirm the dismissal of the Title VII claim.
III.

Here, although Coleman's complaint
conclusorily alleges that Coleman was
terminated based on his race, it does not
assert facts establishing the plausibility of
that allegation. The complaint alleges that
Jones and Broccolina began their campaign
against Coleman in retaliation for his
investigation of Jones's conflict with Shue.
The complaint fuliher alleges that Coleman
"was treated differently as a. result of his
race than whites" and specifically identifies
Broccolina as a white person who was not
disciplined despite having "outside business
involvements." However, the complaint fails
to establish a plausible basis for believing
Broccolina and Coleman were actUally
similarly situated or that race was the true
basis for Coleman's termination. The
complaint does not even allege that
Broccolina's
"outside
business
involvements" were improper, let alone that

Coleman next contends that the district court
erred in dismissing his FMLA claim on the
basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Specifically, he argues that the district court
erred in concluding that Congress
unconstitutionally abrogated the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect
to the FMLA's self-care provision. We
disagree.
The Eleventh Amendment .bars. suit in
federal court against an unconsenting state
and any governmental units that are arms of
the state unless Congress has abrogated the
immunity. In order to do so, Congress must
unequivocally declare its intent to abrogate
and must act pursuant to a valid exercise of
its power. The first prong of this test is
clearly satisfied here. See Nevada Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726,
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123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003)
(explaining that "[t]he clarity of Congress'
intent" to abrogate the states' immunity to
FMLA suits "is not fairly debatable"). It is
the second requirement that is at issue.
The Supreme Court has held that while
Congress cannot validly abrogate a state's
immunity from private suit under its Article
I powers, it can do so under its Fourteenth
Amendment, § 5 authority. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides that "[n]o .State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or imniunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any. person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Section 5
authorizes Congress to enact "appropriate
legislation" to enforce these substantive
guarantees. This section authorizes Congress
not only to codify the Supreme Court's
holdings regarding the rights established by
the. Fourteenth Amendment, but also to
prevent future violations of those rights.
Although Congress may "enact prophylactic
legislation prohibiting conduct that is 'not
itself unconstitutional,'. it may not
substantively
redefine
Fourteenth
protections."
The
Supreme
Amendment
Court has held that to ensure Congress
abides by this distinction, "[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end."
As originally enacted, the FMLA authorized
qualified employees to take up to 12 weeks
of unpaid leave annually in four
circumstances, . three of which concern
caring for family members: bearing and
caring for a child, adopting or providing
foster care for a. child, and caring for a
spouse, child, or parent with a serious health
condition[.] The fourth circumstance is
when "a serious health condition ... makes

the employee unable to perform the
functions of [his] position." Congress has
subsequently amended the FMLA to also .
authorize leave because of an exigency
arising out of the fact that an employee's
spouse, child, or parent is on covered active
duty, or has been notified of an impending
call to such duty in the armed forces. The
FMLA creates a private right of action for
equitable relief or money damages against
any employer that denies its employee his
FMLA rights.
In Nevada Department of Human Resources
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155
L.Ed.2d 953 (2003), on which Coleman
relies, the Supreme Court addressed whether
the FMLA's third provision, relating to
caring for a family member with a serious
health condition, constituted a valid
abrogation of the states' sovereign
immunity. In concluding that it was, the
Court determined that Congress had enacted
the FMLA in response to "the States' record
of unconstitutional participation in, and
fostering of, gender-based discrimination in
the administration of leave benefits." Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 735, 123 S.Ct. 1972; see also id.
at 731, 123 S.Ct. 1972 (describing the
gender gap in state leave policies as being
the result of "the pervasive sex-role
stereotype that caring for family members is
women's work"). The Court confirmed that
a "heightened level of scrutiny" applied to
gender discrimination, which requires that
classifications
distinguishing
between
different genders be substantially related to
the achievement of important governmental
objectives. The Court held that the test was
satisfied in the case of § 2612(a)(1)(C)
because it was "narrowly targeted at the
fault-line between work and familyprecisely
where
sex-based
overgeneralization has been and remains
strongest." As Hibbs concerned only this
family-care provision, § 2612(a)(1)(C), the
Court did not discuss whether Congress
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validly abrogated states' immunity with
regard to the self-care provision, §
2612(a)(1)(D).
The Court's analysis, focused as it is on the
gender-related nature of § 2612(a)(1)(C),
does not support the validity of Congress's
abrogation of sovereign immunity for
violations of §' 2612(a)(1)(D). And, the
legislative history accompanying the FMLA
shows that preventing gender discrimination
was not a significant motivation for
Congress in including the self-care
provision; rather, Congress included that
provision to attempt to' alleviate the
economic effect on employees and their
families of job loss due to sickness and also
to
protect
employees
from
being
discriminated ,against because of their
serious health problems. Moreover, even
had Congress intended the self-care
provision to be protection against gender
discrimination, Congress did not adduce any
evidence establishing a pattern of the states
as employers discriminating on the basis of
gender in granting leave for personal
reasons. Without such evidence, the selfcare provision cannot pass the congruenqeand-proportionality test.
Absent a showing that the self-care
provision is congruent ,and proportional to a

Fourteenth Amendment injury that Congress
enacted the provision to remedy, Coleman is
left to argue that we should simply evaluate
the FMLA's immunity abrogation as a
whole rather than considering the self-care
provision individually. But we know of no
basis for adopting such an undifferentiated
analysis or concluding that the Hibbs Court
did so. Indeed, the Hibbs Court took pains
throughout its opinion to make clear that the
case it was deciding concerned only the
family-leave portion of the FMLA.'
We note that since Hibbs was' decided, each
of the four circuit courts to consider the
issue has concluded that Congress did not
validly abrogate sovereign immunity as to
the FMLA's self-care provision. We now
join these circuits. Because we hold that
Congress did not validly abrogate the states'
immunity, we conclude that the district court
properly dismissed Coleman's FMLA claim
,as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
IV.
In sum, holding that Coleman's complaint
fails to state a Title VII claim for which
relief could be, granted and that his FMLA
claim is barred by sovereign immunity, we
affirm the district court's dismissal of
Coleman's action.
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"Supreme Court Takes Maryland FMLA Case"
Baltimore Daily Record

June 27, 2011
Steve Lash
The Supreme Court will use a lawsuit by a
former Maryland court employee to
determine if ~tates can be sued for violating
the self-care provision of the federal Family
and Medical Leav~ Act.
Daniel Coleman, once the executive director
of procurement and contract administration
at the Administrative Office of the Courts in
Annapolis, claimed he was illegally fired in
August 2007 for taking sick leave.
But a federal judge in Baltimore found the
state was immune from suit, a decision the
4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
last November.
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
review the case.
In 2003, the high court held that the
. FMLA's family-care provisions apply to
state employers. Coleman's attorneys,·
Michael L. Foreman and Edward Smith Jr.,
believe the same lUle should apply to the
self-care provisions.
However, the 2003 case, Nevada DHR v.
Hibbs, did not address the law's self-care
provisions. In the years since Hibbs, six
federal circuits have found that the self-care
provisions apply only to private employers.
This appearance of unanimity, however,
masks the closeness and importance of the
issue, Coleman's lawyers argue, since the
leading cases have recognized that it is
subject to differing interpretations.

This Court should grant certiorari to
definitively resolve the question, Foreman
and Smith successfully argued.
Foreman, who directs the civil rights
appellate clinic at Pennsylvania State
. University's Dickinson School of Law, is
counsel of record at the high court. Smith,
who was Coleman's trial attorney, is a
Baltimore solo practitioner. Neither lawyer
returned telephone messages seeking
. comment Monday afternoon.
Deputy Maryland Solicitor General William
F. Brockman, the state's counsel ofrecord in.
the case, said Monday that he celiainly
would have preferred for the case to be over
rather than have the Supreme Court review a
decision in favor of the state.
Weare confident that whatever way the
Supreme Court comes out, our clients will
win on the merits, he added.
In a brief to the Supreme Court, Broclanan
argued that Congress, in FMLA's self-care
provision, was targeting only the failure of
the private sector to give its workers time off
to care for themselves.
The 4th Circuit correctly found that the selfcare provision was not intended to address
gender discrimination and that there was no
record of discrimination in public
employers' practices regarding medical
leave when FMLA was enacted, Broclanan
wrote.
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In his lawsuit, Coleman claims he sent a
letter to State Court Administrator Frank: V.
Broccolina, requesting sick leave for a
documented medical condition. Broccolina
denied the request and told Coleman he
could either resign or be terminated,
according to the lawsuit.
Coleman was later fired, the lawsuit claims.
Coleman, who is black, also claimed he had
been treated differently as a result of his race
in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
. RightAct.
U.S. District Judge Benson E. Legg
dismissed the Title VII claim, saying
Coleman's complaint failed to allege facts
that . would indicate an unlawful act
occurred. The 4th Circuit affirmed, calling

the complaint conclusory.
The Title VII issue is not before the high
court.
.
Coleman
sought
$1.1
million
in
compensation from the state, including
$500,000 in compensatory damages and
$600,000 in punitive damages. He also
sought reinstatement.
The Maryland Judiciary and Broccolina
have
denied
Coleman's
allegations.
Judiciary spokeswoman Angelita Plemmer
declined to comment on the case Monday.
The high court is expected to hear Coleman
v. Mmyland Court of Appeals et al., No.
10-1016 during the telID that begins in
October.
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"PSU Law Clinic Rides Leave Law
Tiff to High Court"
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
July 25,2011
J en Zimmennan

. When Michael Foreman scanned the list of
petitions that the Supreme Court had granted
on June 27, he said he "blinked a couple of
times at first."
That's because he sawthe name Coleman v.
Mmyland Court of Appeals on it. In that
case, the Civil Rights Appellate Clinic of
Penn State's Dickinson School of Lawwhich Mr. Foreman directs-asked the high
court for a writ of certiorari to decide on the
constitutionality of Congress' abrogation of
states' 11 th Amendment immunity in
passing the Family and Medical Leave Act.
Mr. Foreman, who is set to argue the case
before the Supreme Court, acknowledged
his momentary shock: The court "only takes
about 1 percent of the cases presented to it,"
he explained.
The Coleman case is a test, specifically, of
the FMLA's self-care provision, the petition
said, and whether it annuls the states'
immunity under the U.S. Constitution.
Under the 11th Amendment, states cannot
be held liable for damages and suits held by
individuals unless Congress constitutionally
rescinds the immunity that the amendment
provides, Mr. Foreman explained.
In Coleman, the plaintiff was allegedly
wrongfully discharged after requesting leave
from his fonner workplace, the Maryland
Court of Appeals, under the self-care
provision of the FMLA for a documented,
serious health condition, according to court
papers.

In passing the FMLA and thus abrogating
states' immunity, Congress sought to
eliminate gender discrimination in the
granting of leave from work, which Mr.
Foreman and the clinic believe is the basis
for the act's constitutionality.
"I have no doubt that this is a difficult case,
as the Supreme Court only takes difficult
cases," he said. "However, I think it is a
very worthy issue, and it's certainly one that
[the justices] should hear."
Former senior clinic member Isaac
Wakefield, a recent graduate of Penn State
Law who worked on the Coleman petition
during his time with the clinic, noted that the
quality of work on the petition and the reach
"of this particular case are truly testaments
to the dedication of all of th~ clinic members
involved and their devotion to advocatil'lg on
behalf of Mr. [Daniel] Coleman and other
clients like him."
Clinic members elected to become involved
with the proceedings in Coleman after a
student suggested the case in particular.
"Our clinic looks for cases in which we
think important constitutional issues-issues
that the students may be interested in-are
addressed," Mr. Foremansaid.
He noted that the clinic approached the
Coleman trial counsel during the appeal,
and the plaintiff s attorneys believed that the
clinic would be capable of providing
assistance.
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Mr. Wakefield highlighted the students'
participation in and responsibility for the
cases on Which the clinic opts to work.
"Professor Foreman runs his clinic as a
managing partner would a law firm," Mr.
Wakefield said. "Clinic members are
responsible for the [final] product and are
expected to produce well-researched,
reasoned pieces of work with cogent, wellwritten arguments."
The clinic members "sit down and talk about
the issues and about the way in which the
argument should be framed," Mr. Foreman
said in regard to the process. "The students
do the research; then, we repeatedly draft
until we have a petition that we can file with
the Supreme CQurt."
According to Mr. Foreman, the strategy over
the next several months will be to frame the
argument in such a way that convinces a
majority of the justices of the clinic's
position: that the FMLA's self-care
provision is an appropriate response to
gender discrimination and, thus, that
Congress constitutionally abrogated states'
11 th Amendment immunity when it passed
the provision.

"When Congress passes a law that holds a
state responsible for the owing of money, it
has to make clear that it is invalidating the
state's immunity [with the legislation], and
also, there must be a constitutional reason"
for the abrogation of the immunity, Mr.
Foreman said.
According to the U.S. Department of Labor,
the FMLA provides that employers grant
"eligible, covered employees ... up to 12
weeks of job-protected, unpaid leave during
any 12 month period" for the following
conditions: the birth and care of a child; the
adoption or fostering of a child; the care of
an immediate .family .member who has a
serious health condition; or the care of the
employee's own serious health condition.
When it passed the FMLA, "Congress was
dealing with a big-picture case involving
gender discrimination," Mr. Foreman said.
"The fourth component of the FMLA, the
self-care provision, is just part of what
Congress viewed as the approach to
[eliminating] gender discrimination" in
processing employees' requests for leave
from work.
Mr. Foreman said he hoped to present the.
case in December or January.
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"4th Circuit Upholds Dismissal of Race
Discrimination Case"
Baltimore Daily Record
November 14,2010
Steve Lash

A U.S. appeals court has upheld the
dismissal of an $800,000 race discrimination
case against the Maryland Judiciary, saying
the fired worker's conclusory complaint
failed to allege facts that would indicate an
unlawful act occuned.
Daniel Coleman's bias complaint failed to
rise above the speculative level, the 4th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals stated. Coleman
alleged that he was dismissed as executive
director of procurement and contract
administration at the Administrative Office
of the Courts because he is black.
In 2008, Coleman, through his attorney
Edward Smith Jr., filed suit in U.S. District
Court in Baltimore against the Maryland
Court of Appeals, State Court Administrator
Frank Broccolina and a co-worker, Lany
Jones.
Chief U.S. District Judge Benson E. Legg
dismissed the case in May 2009, saying the
complaint was devoid of any facts from .
which to infer race-based discrimination.
The 4th Circuit, in upholding Legg's
decision, noted that Coleman's complaintalleging discrimination under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act-stated he was
treated differently as a result of his race than
whites who were similarly situated. But the
document provides no further information to
notify the defendants of what the disparate
treatment was or how it adversely affected
Coleman, the 4th Circuit stated in its 3-0
decision last week.

Here, although Coleman's complaint
conclusorilyalleges that Coleman was
terminated based on his race, it does not
assert facts establishing the plausibility of
that allegation, Chief Judge William B.
Traxler Jr. wrote for the appellate court ..
Absent such support, the complaint's
allegations of race discrimination do not rise
above speculation.
Smith, a solo practitioner in Baltimore, did
not return telephone messages Friday
seeking comment on the 4th Circuit's
decision.
The Maryland Judiciary, through a
spokeswoman, declined to comment on the
decision.
.
Joining Traxler's opmlOn were judges
Dennis W. Shedd and James C. Dever III.
Dever, a judge on the U.S. District Comi for
Eastern NOlih Carolina, was sitting in on the
case by designation.
The 4th Circuit's ruling followed the
Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal.
In Iqbal, the justices dismissed a Pakistani
Muslim's claim that then-Attorney General
John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robeli S.
Mueller III ordered him detained after the
Sept. 11, 2001, tenorist attacks because of
his national origin and religion. The high
comi said Javaid Iqbal's complaint failed to
allege sufficient facts to suppOli a claim of
purposeful and unlawful discrimination.
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Quoting from the Iqbal decision, the 4th
Circuit said, Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.
Coleman, who was with the Administrative
Office of the Courts from 2001 to August
2007, said the illegal discrimination
occUlTed after he investigated a personnel
matter in 2005 that involved Jones, a
member of the procurement and contract
administration staff. According to the
complaint, Jones received a five-day

suspension, but administrator Broccolina
intervened and Jones received a one-day
suspenSIOn.
Broccolina then began to
Coleman, the complaint stated.

investigate

Coleman said he was fired in August 2007
because of his race.
He sought $200,000 in compensatory and
$600,000 in punitive damages.

***
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Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC
10-1195
Ruling Below: Mims v. Arrow Fin. Services, LLC, 10-12077,2010 WL 4840430 (11th Cir. Nov.
30,2010) cert. granted, 10-1195,2011 WL 1212225 (U.S. June 27, 2011).

Petitioner Marcus Minis brought suit against Arrow Financial Services for alleged violations of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The district court dismissed Mims' claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to an Eleventh Circuit holding that Congress granted state
courts exclusive jurisdiction over private actions under this Act. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
on appeal. The relevant language of the TCP A is contained in Section 227 and states a person
"may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring [an action] in an
appropriate court of that State .... " There is a circuit split on the issue of whether this language
preserves federal question jurisdiction for claims under the TCP A.
Question Presented: Did Congress divest the federal district courts of their federal-question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over private actions brought under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act?
Marcus D. MIMS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
November 30, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] ,
PER CURIAM:
Marcus Mims appeals the district court's
dismissal of his complaint against An-ow
Financial Services, LLC, for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Mims' complaint alleged
that A11'0W acted in violation of' the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47
U.S.C. § 227. Mims acknowledges that this
Court has held that federal courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction over private
actions under the Act. Mims, however,
contends that we should reconsider our
binding precedent in light of two Supreme
Court decisions and a Seventh Circuit
decision.

We held in Nicholson v. Hooters ofAugusta,
Inc. that "Congress granted state courts
exclusive jurisdiction over private actions
under the Act," and therefore "federal courts
lack subj ect matter jurisdiction [over]
private actions under the Act." 136 F.3d
1287, 1288-89 (11th Cir.1998), modified,
140 F.3d 898 (11th Cir.l998). We are bound
by this precedent:
Mims, in asking this Court to reconsider its
precedent, points to Grable & Sons Metal
Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng'g, 545 U.S.
308, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257
(2005), and Breuer v. Jim's Concrete. of
Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 123 S.Ct. 1882,
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155 L.Ed.2d 923 (2003). Neither of those
cases considered the Act, and neither of
them explicitly or implicitly overrules our
precedent. See United States v. Kaley, 579
F.3d 1246, 1255 ("To constitute an
ovelTuling ... the Supreme Court decision
must be clearly on point. ") (citations and
quotations omitted). Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Brill v.
CountrYWide Home Loans, Inc.,· 427 F.3d
446 (7th Cir.2005), does not· overturn our
precedent. See Kaley, 579 F.3d at 1255

("We may disregard the holding of a prior
opinion only where that holding is overruled
by the Court sitting en bane or by the
Supreme Court.") (citations and quotations
omitted).
Accordingly, the district court properly
dismissed Mims' complaint for lack of.
subject matter jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
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"A Question Worth Answering Under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act: U.S. Supreme Court to
Hear Whether the TCPA Contemplates Suits in
Federal Courts"
Reed Smith
July 8, 2011
Judith L. Harris & Amy S. Mushahwar

There is no question that Congress
contemplated a private right of action under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), and the
plaintiffs' bar has taken full advantage of
that right. It has been less clear, however,
which courts have jurisdiction over such
suits .. The U.S. Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari on this very issue in Mims
v. Arrow Financial Services.

ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d
513 (3rd Cir. 1998) (holding Congress
intended to refer private litigants under the
TCP A to state court, and to preclude federal
question jurisdiction)
International Science
& Technology
Institute, Inc. v. Inacom Communications,
Inc., 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
TCP A private actions)

Background

Under Section 227 of the TCP A, a person
"may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or
rules of court of a State, bring in an
appropriate court of that State ... " an action
for a TCPA violation. Id. (emphasis added).
The statute is silent, however, regarding
whether, in granting jurisdiction to state
courts under certain conditions, Congress
meant to divest U.S. district cOUlis of their
federal question jurisdiction and bar the
filing of such suits in federal courts.
The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have all held that federal
courts lack federal question jurisdiction over
TCPA private actions.·See,
Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v.
Telecommunications Premium Services,
Ltd., 156 F.3d 432 (2nd Cir. 1998) (holding
state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
a cause of action created by the TCP A)

Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp.,
131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding
Congress granted state courts exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction over TCPA
private actions)
Murphy v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding state courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over a private cause of action
created by TCP A)
Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136
F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1998), modified, 140
F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding Congress
intended to assign the TCP A private right of
action to state courts exclusively)

On the other hand, the· Sixth and Seventh
Circuits have ruled that federal courts do
have federal question jurisdiction over
private TCP A suits. See,
Charvat v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 630 F3d
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459 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding federal district
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over
TCPA private actions)

Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., 427
F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding state
courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction
over TCPA private actions)
Mims v. Arrow Financial Services
Enter plaintiff Marcus Mims . . . and,
ultimately, the u.s. Supreme Court. Mims
sued in federal court in Florida under the
TCP A private right of action provision after
he allegedly received multiple calls to his
cell phone from a student loan debt collector
who used an autodialer to place the calls and
left prerecorded voicemail messages. The
court, however, decided it lacked federal
question jurisdiction to hear the case and
dismissed it. The dismissal was affirmed by
the Eleventh Circuit. Mims petitioned for
celiiorari, which the Court granted June 27.
While in his celi petition Mims discussed
common grounds for granting certiorari,
such as the split among the federal circuits
and the high volume of federal cases that
have grappled with this jurisdictional issue
(according to Mims, 19 district court cases
between 2010 and 2011 alone), he also
invoked tWo of the Justices' own prior
opmlOns on TCP A' jurisdiction. Both
Justices Alito and Sotomayor, before joining
the Court, had ruled on cases decidIng
TCP A jurisdiction; Justice Alito had
actually agreed with Mims' position that
federal courts should have federal question
jurisdiction over TCP A private actions.
ErieNet, Inc., 156 F.3d at 521 (3rd Cir.
1998) (Alito, J. dissenting). Justice
Sotomayor authored a Second Circuit
opinion that concluded that federal courts
could hear TCP A private actions through
diversity jurisdiction (where the parties are

citizens of different states and the amount in
controversy is greater than $75,000).
Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335
(2nd Cir. 2006).
Mims' petition discusses several other
problems-from a plaintiffs perspectivewith the majority interpretation of §
227(b)(3) of the TCPA as divesting federal
comis of federal question jurisdiction. Mims
argues that such an approach leaves the state
courts with great power to interpret federal
law and to oversee an issue that has national
scope. Mims' second issue goes back to the
statutory language of the TCP A. A private
TCP A action can only be brought in a state
court if it is "permitted by the laws or rules
of court of a State." A state could
theoretically, and several already do,
prohibit private TCP A actions.
Mims makes a number of brief arguments as
to why the majority approach (federal courts
lack federal question jurisdiction) is legally
wrong on its merits. These arguments have
been invoked and dismissed in a number of
cases that have concluded that federal courts
lack jurisdiction to heal' TCP A private
actions. These arguments include:
• The majority approach ignores the plain
language of the statute creating federal
question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The
TCP A private right of action is a civil action .
that "aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." While Mims
argues that the TCP A is a federally created
law, and without it there would be no private
right of action, .Mims fails to' take into
account that federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction and that Congress can
limit jurisdiction as it sees fit.
• The majority approach drew the wrong
inference when comparing the private right
of action with the TCPA's grant of authority
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to the states to sue in federal courts for
TCP A violations. When a state attorney
general sues for a TCP A violation, the
statute explicitly states .that the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 227(f)(2), while the same statute says only
that a private party "may . . . bring [an
action] in an appropriate court of that State."
Mims argues the term "may" permissively
grants state courts jurisdiction and does not
divest federal question jurisdiction from the
federal courts.
• Congress only spoke of state court
jurisdiction in the private right of action
section so as not to create the impression
that only federal courts had jurisdiction over
private claims. In other words, the statute
was supposed to make sure state and federal
courts had concurrent jurisdiction. However,
state comis generally already have
concurrent jurisdiction: State courts can hear

claims arising under federal laws without
any explicit authorization from Congress.
Interpreting § 227(b)(3) of the TCP A as
Mims does would make the statute's
language redundant.
Arguments in Mims v. Arrow Financial
Services will not take place until the
Supreme Court reconvenes for its 2011
Term in October. As the petition and grant
of certiorari highlights, telephonic marketing
is still on the national agenda. In addition to
potentially increasing the number of forums
in which TCP A private actions could be
brought, the case could also provide a forum
for the plaintiffs' bar to generate interest
among consumers in pursuing TCP A claims.
F or organizations that abide by TCPA
regulations, examining the impact Mims v.
Arrow Financial Services could have on
your business could be worth the time.
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Williams v. Maryland
10-1207
Ruling Below: Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479 (2011).

In 2007, an officer with the Prince George's County Police Department observed petitioner
Charles F. Williams going through a backpack and placing something from the backpack into the
bushes. When the officer questioned Williams, he revealed he had placed a gun in the bushes.
Williams was charged with violating a Maryland law that requires a permit to wear, carry, or
transport a handgun outside of one's home.
At a bench trial, the defense put forth that Williams purchased the gun for self-defense and had
completed the Maryland State Police application required for firearm purchase. Williams Claims
he was transporting the gun from his girlfriend's home to his own. Williams had never applied
for a carry permit.
Williams was found guilty of violating Maryland's carry law and unsuccessfully appealed his
conviction. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held the carry law satisfied the Second
Amendment because it did not restrict wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm in the home.
Williams continued to assert on appeal before Maryland Court of Appeals that the carry law
violates his Second Amendment rights in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in District of
Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed
Williams' conviction finding language in those opinions that. could be read as an extension of the
Supreme Court's decision beyond home possession to be dicta and thus inapposite to carry laws.
Question Presented: Whether the right to carry or transport a registered handgun outside the
home without a carry permit is protected by the Second Amendment.
Charles Francis WILLIAMS, Jr.

v.
STATE of Maryland.

Court of Appeals of Maryland
January 05,2011
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
BATTAGLIA, J.
In this case, we enter into the constitutional
fray involving the scope of the Second
Amendment right to bear arms, recently
explored by the Supreme Court in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct.
2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) and

McDonald v. City of Chicago, -U.S. - ,130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010).
Petitioner, Charles F. Williams, Jr., seeks to
oveliurn his conviction in the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County for unlawful
possession of a handgun, pursuant to Section
4-203(a)(1)(i) of the Criminal Law Article,
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Maryland Code· (2002), asserting that
Maryland's regulatory scheme for handguns
violates his right to "keep and carry arms"
under the Second Amendment. The Court of
Special . Appeals
affirmed Williams'
conviction, in a reported opinion, Williams
v. State, 188 Md.App. 691, 982 A.2d 1168
(2009), and we granted certiorari, Williams
v. State, 412 Md. 495, 988 A.2d 1008
(2010), to answer the following question:
Are Md.Code Ann. Criminal Law § 4-203,
Public Safety §§ 5-301, et seq., and
COMAR 29.03.02.04 unconstitutional m
light of Heller v. District of Columbia?
We shall hold that Section 4-203(a)(1)(i) of
the Criminal Law Article, which prohibits
wearing, carrying, or transporting a
handgun, without a permit and outside of
one's home, is outside of the scope of the
Second Amendment. We also shall hold
that, because Williams failed to apply for a
permit to wear, carry, or transport a
handgun, he lacks standing to challenge
Section 5-301 et seq. of the Public Safety
Article, Maryland Code (2003), as well as
COMAR 29.03.02.04. As a result,
Williams's conviction will stand.
During a bench trial before the Honorable
Sean D. Wallace, the State presented the
following facts, describing a police officer's
encounter with Williams near a bus stop: .
The facts, as stipulated, had the
matter gone to trial, the facts would
show that on· October 1, 2007, at
approximately 5 :00 p.m., Officer
Molake with the Prince George's
County Police Department, was in
the area of the BaltimoreWashington Parkway and Landover
Road in Prince George's County,
Maryland, and as he was driving in
that area, he observed the defendant
going through a backpack near a

wooded area nearby the cross area,
and at one time, as the officer turned
his cruiser around, he observed the
defendant tum and place something
in the brush area as if he was hiding
something~

Officer Molake made contact with
the defendant, who he would identify
as the gentleman seated to the left
with the green shirt and asked him
what he was doing. The defendant
told him he was going through the
backpack to see what was in it. He
then asked the defendant what he
went and hid in the bushes, and the
defendant hesitated and then stated
"my gun."
The facts described the police officer's
recovery of Williams's handgun. and
Williams's stat~ment to police:
Officer Molake then recovered an
Austria [sic] made, black Glock
handgun with 15 rounds in the
magazine in the brush area where he
saw the defendant go.
.The defendant gave a written
statement ·after being given his
Miranda rights by Officer Santa
Cruz, admitting to possession of the
gun and placing the gl(n in the bush
area where the officer subsequently
located it.
The handgun test-fired as positive.
The facts provided the following, regarding
Williams's purchase of the handgun,
apparently for "self-defense":
The defense would have provided
evidence by way of documents that
would show that the defendant
purchased the handgun in Realco at
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6108 Marlboro Pike in Forestville,
Maryland, on August 15 of 2007, ,
and that would be shown through
Exhibit 1. Paid the balance that was
due on that handgun on September
14, 2007, which will be shown in
Exhibit 2; that the defense would
have provided evidence that the
defendant completed the Maryland
State Police application and affidavit
to ,purchase a regulated firearm
application, which is a total of three
pages, on August 15, 2007, which
will be shown in Exhibit 3. He
of
received
the
certificate
completion, which is shown in
Exhibits 4 and 5, on August 15,
2007.
The defendant would have testified
that he purchased the handgun for
self-defense, and that on the date of
this arrest, he had just left the
handgun at his girlfriend's house,
place of residence. When he got off
work, he went to her residence and
picked up that handgun and was en
route to his home when the arrest
occurred behind the bus stop.
The defendant was again given
Miranda rights and gave a written
statement that will be shown in the
State's Exhibits Number 3 and 4.
Judge Wallace found Williams guilty of
wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun
in violation of Section 4-203(a)(1)(i) and
sentenced him to three years' incarceration,
with two years suspended. The Court of
, Special Appeals affirmed, determining that
the Second Amendment is not applicable to
the States, 5 and that, were the Second
The Circuit Court's decision and the Court of
Special Appeals's opinion in the present case were
rendered prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, U.S. - - , 130

Amendment to apply to Maryland, "it would
. not invalidate the statute at issue here,"
because Section 4-203(b)(6) expressly
permits wearing, carrying, or transporting a
handgun in one's residence, thereby
preserving the right "to keep and bear arms
in the home for the purpose of immediate
self-defense." Williams, 188 Md.App. at
699,982 A.2d at 1172.
Before us, as he did in the Circuit Court in a
"Motion to Dismiss Indictment," and in his
brief before the Court of Special Appeals,
Williams asserts that the prohibition in
Section 4-203(a) against wearing, carrying,
or transpOliing a handgun without a permit
and outside of one's home, infringes upon
his Second Amendment right "to keep and
bear arms." He contends that the Supreme
Court opinions in Heller and McDonald
make clear that the Second Amendment
establishes a general "right of persons to
keep and bear arms for lawful purposes."
The State counters that the opinions in
Heller and McDonald together stand for the
proposition that, pursuant to the Second
Amendment, . "states may not generally
prohibit the possession of a handgun in the
home for the purpose of self-defense, but
remain free to enact reasonable restrictions
on the possession and use of firearms." The
State contends that the statutory scheme
embodied in Section 4-203 is eminently
reasonable, because Section 4-203(b)(6)
expressly permits wearing, carrying, or
transporting a handgun in the home.
We begin by exploring the dictates of
Section· 4-203(a) of the Criminal Law
Article, which contains a prohibition against
wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun
in public, "whether concealed or open":

5

S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), which made the
Second Amendment applicable to the States via the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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(a) Prohibited.-(l) Except as
provided in subsection (b) of this
section, a person may not:
(i) wear, calTy, or transport a
handgun, whether concealed or open,
on or about the person; or
(ii) wear, calTy, or knowingly
transport a handgun, whether
concealed or open, in a vehicle
traveling on a road or parking lot
generally used by the public,
highway, waterway, or airway of the
State.
The exceptions to the prohibition, contained
in Section 4-203(b), are many:
(b) Exceptions.-This section does
not prohibit:

***
(2) the wearing, calTying, or
transporting of a handgun by a
person to whom a pelTllit to wear,
calTy, or transport the handgun has
been issued under [§§ 5-301-5-314
of the Public Safe~y Article, .
Maryland Code (2003)];

calTying, or transporting of a handgun in
one's residence. What is notable in the
present case is that Williams did not apply
for a pelTllit. 6 Moreover, at the time of his
alTest, he was not wearing, calTying, or
transporting a handgun in his residence, as
pelTllitted by the statute.
Williams, nevertheless, principally relies
upon the Supreme Court's opinions in
Heller, 554 U.S. at 570, 128 S.Ct. at 2783,
171 L.Ed.2d at 637, and McDonald, U.S. at--, 130 S.Ct.at 3020,177 L.Ed.2d
at 894, in asserting that the Second
Amendment establishes a general "right of
persons to keep and bear arms for lawful
purposes." In Heller, Mr. Heller had applied
for and was denied a "registration
certificate" to possess a handgun in his
home, pursuant to the District of Columbia's
gun control scheme. Section 7-2502.01(a) of
the
D.C.Code
(2001)
prohibited
"possess [ion] or control" of any firearm,
without a "valid registration certificate":
(a) Except as otherwise provided in
this unit, no person or organization
In
the District of Columbia
("District") shall receive, possess,
control, transfer, offer for sale, sell,
give, or deliver any destructive

***
Williams argues, in this regard, that Sections 5-301
et seq. of the Public Safety Article, Maryland Code
(2003), as well as Title 29, subtitle 3 of the Code of
Maryland Regulations, together governing handgun
permitting, impose an impermissible burden on
citizens seeking to exercise the right to "keep and
carry a handgun.'; Williams acknowledges that he has
"not filed an· application for a permit to carry a
handgun," but asserts that as a result of the regulatory
scheme, "any such application would have been
denied." The State counters that nearly 93 percent of
handgun permit applicants from 2006 to 2009 were
issued permits. Nevertheless, because Williams failed
to file an application for a permit to carry a handgun,
he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of
Sections 5-301 et seq. of the Public Safety Article, as
well as Title 29, subtitle 3 of the Code of Maryland
Regulations.
6

(6) the wearing, calTying, or
transporting of a handgun by a
person on real estate that the person
owns or leases or where the person
resides or within the confines of a
business establishment that the
person owns or leases;

***
.Here, the relevant exceptions are Section 4203(b)(2), involving a pelTllit to wear, calTy,
or transport a handgun in public, as well as
Section 4-203(b)(6), permitting the wearing,
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device,
and
no
person
or
organization in the District shall
possess or control any firearm,
unless the person or organization
holds a valid registration certificate
for the firearm.
Section 7-2502.02(a)(4) of the D.C.Code
(2001) prohibited the registration of
handguns, without an exception for
possession in one's home:
(a) A registration certificate shall not be
issued for a:
(1 ) Sawed-off shotgun;
(2) Machine gun;
(3) Short-barreled rifle; or
(4) Pistol not validly registered to the
cunent registrant in the District prior
to September 24, 1976, except that
the provisions of this section shall
not apply to any organization that
employs at least 1 commissioned
special, police officer or other
employee licensed to carry a firearm
and that arms the employee with a
firearm during the employee's duty
hours or to a police officer who has
retired from the Metropolitan Police
Department.
Section 7-2507.02 of the D.C.Code (2001)
mandated that any other firearm within
one's home be kept "unloaded and
disasse~bled or bound'by a trigger lock":
Except
for
law
enforcement
personnel described in § 72502.01(b)(1), each registrant shall
keep any firearm in his possession
unloaded and disassembled or bound
by a trigger lock or similar device
unless such fireaim is kept at his
place of business, or while being

used for lawful recreational purposes
within the District of Columbia.
Sections 22-4504(a) and 22-4515 of the
D.C.Code (2001) made carrying an
unlicenced pistol in one's home or on one's
land a misdemeanor. Section 22-4504(a)
stated, in relevant part:
(a) No person shall carry within the
District of Columbia either openly or
concealed on or about their person, a
pistol, without a license .issued
pursuant to District of Columbia law,
or any deadly or dangerous weapon
capable of being so concealed.
Whoever violates this section shall
be punished as provided in § 224515 ....
Section 22-4515. of the D.C.Code (2001) in
tum, stated:
Any violation of any provision of
this chapter for which no penalty is
specifically provided shall be
punished by a fine of not more· than
$1,000 or imprisonment for not more
than 1 year, or both.
Mr. Heller filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief from the denial of his application for a
'(registration certificate" to possess a
handgun in his home, the licensing
requirement insofar as it prohibited the
carrying of a handgun in the home, and the
trigger-lock requirement insofar as it
prohibited the possession of "functional
firemms" in the home. The District Court
dismissed the complaint, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed, reasoning ~hat·
the Second Amendment precluded the
District from "flatly banEning] the keeping
of a handgun in the home." The Supreme
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Court granted the District's petition for a
writ of certiorari, presenting the following
question:
Whether the following provisions-·
D.C.Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 224504(a), and 7-2507.02-violate the
Second Amendment rights of
individuals who are not affiliated
with any state-regulated militia,but
who wish to keep handguns and
other firearms for private use in their
homes?
Before the Court, the District argued that the
Second Amendment protects "only militiarelated firearm rights." Alternatively, the
District contended that prohibiting handgun
possession in the home was reasonable,
because residents were permitted to possess
shotguns and rifles, albeit unloaded or
bound by a trigger lock. Mr. Heller
countered that. the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to possess a
firearm for "traditionally lawful purposes,
such as self-defense within the home."
Embracing an original meaning· approach,
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court,
interpreted the language of the Second
Amendment as conferring an individual
right "to keep and bear AnTIs." The Court
considered the substance of that individual
right as "simply a common way of referring
to possessing arms, for militiamen and
ev~ryone else." Similarly, the phrase "bear
Alms," reasoned the Court, referred to the
"carrying of weapons," both in an organized
militia and for other purposes, such as selfdefense. The COUli concluded that
"preserving the militia" was not the only
aim of the Second Amendment, as the
founders "most undoubtedly thought it even
more important for self-defense and
hunting." This right "to keep and bear
Arms," however, has limitations:

Like most rights, the right secured by
the Second Amendment is not
unlimited. From Blackstone through
19th century cases, commentators
and courts routinely explained that
the right was not a right to keep and
carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever
purpose. For example, the majority
of the 19th-century courts to
consider the question held that
prohibitions on carrying concealed
weapons w~re lawful under the
Second Amendment or state
analogues. Although we do not
undertake an exhaustive historical
analysis today of the full scope of the
Second Amendment, nothing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding
the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws
imposing
conditions
and
qualifications on the commercial sale
. of arms.

Id. at 626-27, 128 S.Ct. at 2816-17, 171
L.Ed.2d at 678 (internal citations omitted).
In declaring Sections 7-2502.02(a)(4)
(prohibiting the registration of handguns,
without a home exception) and 22-4504(a)
(prohibiting carrying a handgun within one's
home, without a license) unconstitutional,
the Court emphasized that handguns were
"overwhelmingly chosen by American
society" for self-defense and determined that
under any standard of scrutiny, "bamling
from the home the most preferred firearm in
the nation to keep and use for protection of
one's home and family, would fail
constitutional muster." The District's
trigger-lock requirement, contained in
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Section 7-2507.02, did not fare any better,
according to the Court, because the
provision "ma[de] it impossible for citizens
to use [firearms] for the core lawful purpose
of self-defense" within the home. Therefore,
the prohibition against handguns, even
within one's home, as well as the triggerlock requirement for all firearms kept within
the home, were declared unconstitutional.
Shortly thereafter, in McDonald, _. U.S. at
- - , 130 S.Ct. at 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d at 894,
the Supreme Court was asked to consider
whether the Second Amendment applied to
the States. In that case, Otis McDonald,
Adam Orlov, Colleen Lawson, and David
Lawson filed a complaint in .the United
States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, seeking a declaratory
judgment that several Chicago ordinances
violated the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Chicago residents alleged
that the City had denied their applications to
register handguns for possession in the
home, in violation of the Constitution. In a
related lawsuit, the National Rifle
Association and two residents of Oak Park, a
Chicago suburb, filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, seeking a declaration that
several Oak Park ordinances were invalid
pursuant· to the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments. That complaint alleged that,
but for the gun control laws, the individual
plaintiffs would keep handguns in their
homes for self-defense.
The statutes at issue were "similar to the
District of Columbia's," according to the
Court. Section 8-20-040(a) of the Chicago,
Illinois Code prohibited possession of a
firearm unless registered, while Section 820-050(c) provided that "[n]o registration
-certificate shall be issued for any of the
following· types of firearms . . . (c)
Handguns." The only non-governmental
exception to the prohibition against

handguns was for "[t]hose validly registered
to a current owner in the City of Chicago
prior to [1982]." Section 27-2-1 of the Oak
Park, Illinois Code also provided that "[i]t
shall be unlawful for any person to possess
or carry, or for any person to permit another
to possess or carryon hislher land or in
hislher place of business any firearm."
Section 27-1-1, in tum, defined "firearms"
as "pistols, revolvers, guns and small arms
of a size and character that may be
concealed on or about the person, commonly
known as handguns."
The district court judge entered judgment on
the pleadings for both inunicipalities. The
United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the
Supreme Court had never considered
whether the Second Amendment should be
applied to the States through the .Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In reversing, the Supreme Court determined
that the Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms "is fundamental to our
scheme of ordered liberty," and as a result,
the Due Process Clause rendered it
applicable to the States. The Court
characterized Heller as safeguarding an
individual right of "self-defense," when
home possession was in issue, but,
nevertheless, reiterated that regulatory
schemes prohibiting handgun ownership by
dangerous individuals, or prohibiting
wearing, carrying, or transpOliing handguns
in various public places outside of the home,
were permissible:We made it clear in Heller that our
holding did not cast doubt on such
longstanding regulatory measures as
"prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally
ill," "laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as
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schools and government buildings,
or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale
of arms."
fd. at - - , 130 S.Ct. at 3047, 177 L.Ed.2d
at 926, quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27,

128 S.Ct. at 2817, 171 L.Ed.2d at 678.
In the present case, Section 4-203(a)(I)(i) of
which Williams was convicted, prohibits
"wear[ing], carry [ing], or transport[ing] a
handgun, whether concealed or open, on or
about the person," in public, without a
permit. Here, sufficient evidence was
adduced to demonstrate that Williams was
wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun
in public, and Williams had conceded that
he had not obtained, or even applied for, a
permit.
Williams, however, attempts to bring his
conviction of wearing, carrying, or
transporting a handgun in public, without a
permit, within the ambit of Heller and
McDonald by claiming that those opinions
would prohibit his conviction. This is not the
case, because Heller and McDonald
emphasize that the Second Amendment is
applicable to statutory prohibitions against
home possession, the dicta in McDonald that
"the Second Amendment protects a personal
right to keep and bear arms for lawful
purposes, most notably for self-defense
notwithstanding.
within the home,"
Although Williams attempts to find succor
in this dicta, it is clear that prohibition of
firearms in the home was the gravamen of
the certiorari questions in both Heller and
McDonald and their answers. If the Supreme
Court, in this dict~, meant its holding to
extend beyond home possession, it will need
to say so more plainly.
Williams was . convicted of wearing,
carrying, or transporting a handgun in
public, rather than for possession of a

handgun in his home, for which he could not
be prosecuted under Section 4-203(b)(6). It
is the exception permitting home possession
in Section 4-203(b)(6) that takes the
statutory scheme embodied in Section 4-203
outside of the scope of the Second
Amendment, as miiculated in Heller f.md
McDonald. Section 4-203(b)(6) clearly
permits wearing, carrying, or transporting a
handgun "by a person on real estate that the
person owns or leases or where the person
resides," without registering or obtaining a
permit, wholly consistent with Heller's
. proviso that handguns are "the most
preferred firearm in the nation to keep and
use for protection of one's home and
family."
In affirming Williams' conviction, we find
persuasive opinions from other courts,
addressing analogous situations, in which a
defendant was convicted pursuant to a
statute prohibiting public possession of a
firearm, while providing an exception for
possession within the home. For example, in
People v. Dawson, 403 I11.App.3d 499, 343
Ill.Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d 598 (2010),
Dawson had been found guilty· of three
counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm
and two counts of aggravated unlawful use
of a weapon in connection with the
attempted murder of Mario Brantley.·
Dawson argued that his convictions under
the Illinois aggravated unlawful use of a
weapon statute should be reversed, because
the measure violated the
Second
.Amendment. The Illinois aggravated
unlawful use of a weapon statute under
which Dawson· was convicted mirrors
Maryland's Section 4-203 and relevantly
provides:
"(a) A person commits the offense of
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon
when he or she knowingly:
(1) Carries· on or about his or her
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person or in any vehicle or concealed
on or about his or her person except
when on his or her land or in his or
her abode or fixed place of business
any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser
or other firearm;

***
[and]

***
(3) One of the following factors is
present:
(A) the firearm possessed was
uncased, loaded and immediately
accessible at the time of the·
offense[.]"

Id., 343 Ill.Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d at 604,
quoting 720 ILCS S/24-1.6(a)(l), (a)(3)(A)
(West 2006) (alteration In original)
(emphasis added).
The Illinois intermediate appellate court
affirmed Dawson's conviction, reasoning
that· in Heller, the. Supreme Court
"ultimately limited its holding to the
question presented-that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms protected the
right to possess a commonly used firearm, a
handgun, in the home. for self-defense
purposes." The court further emphasized
that, in· McDonald, the Supreme Court
addressed "the limited question of whether a
ban on the possession of a handgun in the
home violated the Second Amendment right
to bear arms." The court concluded that the
statute under which Dawson was convicted
was constitutional, because it specifically
permitted possession of a firearm within
one's home.
In Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096
(D.C. 2010), Little was convicted by a jury

of one count of carrying a pistol without a
license, one count of possession of an
unregistered firearm, and one count of
unlawful possession of ammunition, as a
result of his involvement in an attempted
robbery. Little argued that his convictions
must be reversed in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Heller, because the
statutes "functioned as a total ban on
handguns." The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals rejected that argument and
affirmed Little's conviction, reasoning that
Heller,
"the
issue
was
the
in
constitutionality of the District of
Columbia's ban on 'the possession of usable
handguns in the home, '" and Little had
conceded that he was outside of his home.
In People v. YarbiAough, 169 Cal.App.4th.
303, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 674 (Cal.Ct.App.2008),
Yarbrough was arrested and convicted of
carrying a concealed weapon in public, in
violation of a California statute, which
provided:
A person is guilty of carrying a .
concealed firearm when he or she
does any of the following:
(1) Carries concealed within any
vehicle which is under his or her
control or direction any pistol,
revolver, or other firearm capable of
being concealed on the person.
(2) Carries concealed upon his or her
person any pistol, revolver, or other
firearm capable of being concealed
upon the person.
(3) Causes to be carried concealed
within any vehicle in which he or she
is an occupant any pistol, revolver,
or other firearm capable of being
concealed upon the person.

Id. at 313 n. 5, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 674, quoting·
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Section 1202S(a) of the California Penal
Code.
The California intermediate appellate court
noted that a separate measure provided an
exception for· possession of concealed
weapons "anywhere within the citizen's or
legal resident's place of residence, place of
business, or on. private property owned or
lawfully possessed by the citizen or legal
resident." Although Yarbrough argued that
the concealed weapons statute was
unconstitutional in light of Heller, the court
rejected that argument and affirmed his
conviction,. reasoning that in Heller, the
Supreme Court considered a narrow
question, namely whether "the District's ban
on handgun· possession in the horne
violate[d] the Second Amendment." The
court concluded that, "[u]nlike possession of.
a gun for protection within a residence,
carrying a concealed firearm presents a
recognized threat to public order, and is
prohibited as a means of preventing physical
hann to persons other than the offender." .

As a result, we affirm Williams' conviction
of wearing, carrying, or transporting a
handgun in violation of Section 4203(a)(1)(i) ofthe Criminal Law Article.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
. OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONER.
MURPHY, J., concurs.
MURPHY, J., concurring.
While I agree with the majority that the
Petitioner's conviction should be affirmed, I .
would not hold that the Petitioner's conduct
is "outside of the scope of the Second
Amendment." I would affirm on the ground
that, . although the Second Amendment is
applicable to an "on the street" possession of
a handgun, that Amendment is satisfied by a
statute that places reasonable restrictions on
the constitutional right to bear arms.
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"Cert. Petition in Right to Carry Case"
The Volokh Conspiracy
April 22, 2011
David Kopel
Filed earlier this week by Stephen Halbrook,
in the case of Williams v. Maryland. In
short, Maryland bans all . handgun
transportation or carry without a pennit, and
has a pennitting process which formally
declares that it will deny pennits to almost
everyone. As the petition explains, "the
Maryland State Police, the Maryland
Handgun Pennit Review Board, and the
Maryland
courts
have
consistently
interpreted
these
provlSlons
[state
regulations] to require the applicant to
document, typically with police reports, that
he or she has been the victim of assaults,
threats, or robberies, except for applications
involving certain occupations."
Williams was peaceably transporting his
handgun from his girlfriend's home to his
own home. He has been convicted, and
sentenced to a year in prison. The state's
highest court, the Maryland Court of
Appeals, rejected Williams'
Second
Amendment challenge, because, supposedly,
the Heller and McDonald affinnations of a
general right to carry handguns (except in
"sensitive places") is mere dicta which the
Maryland court will not follow unless a
future U.S. Supreme Court. cases formally
announces "we meant what we already
said."
As Halbrook points out, "When the Framers
intended that a provision of the Bill of
Rights related to a house, they said so. [3d
and 4th amendments.] They did not
recognize a limited right to keep and bear
anns only in one's house. Despite this plain
textual reference prohibiting infringement
on the right to 'bear arms,' the Maryland
court argued that the right need not be

recognized at all because this Court has not
decided cases directly on point. 'But general
statements of the law are not inherently
incapable of giving fair and clear warning ..
.' United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271
(1997).1 [note 2:] 'The easiest cases don't
even arise. There has never been . . . a
section 1983 case accusing welfare officials
of selling foster children into slavery; it does
not follow that if such a case arose, the
officials would be· immune from damages
[or criminal] liability.' Id."
Further, Heller's right to carry language is
not dicta, according to McDonald: "our
central holding in Heller: that the Second
Amendment protects a personal right to keep
and bear arms for lawful purposes, most
notably for self-defense within the home."
As· Halbrook points out, this inescapably
"implies a right to bear arms outside the
home (even if not quite as 'notably' as in the
home)."
Williams had not applied for a pennit, which
would. have been futile in light of
Maryland's established policy of permit
denials. The Maryland Court of Appeals
held the Williams therefore lacked standing
to challenge the statute. Halbrook responds:
This is completely unfounded given
Petitioner's . criminal conviction.
Under this Court's precedents, it is
not a requirement for standing to
challenge
an
allegedly
unconstitutional permit requirement
that one must apply for the pennit
and be denied. A long line of cases
have invalidated pennit requirements
to exercise First Amendment rights
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in which the defendants who were
convicted did not apply for permits.
One of the more recent cases is
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of
New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton,
536 U.S. .150,
156 (2002)
(invalidating permit requirement
even though "Petitioners did not
apply fora permit. ").

even if there were some general
requirement for Petitioner to submit
an application in order to challenge
the permit statute, that requirement

would be eliminated here under the
doctrine of futility. This court has
made it clear in various contexts that
litigants are not required to perform a
futile
act.
See,
e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 625-26 (2001) (where
limitations imposed by wetland
regulations were clear, and there was
no
indication
that kind of use sought by landowner
would have been allowed, court did
not require submission of "futile
applications" with other agencies);

***
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"Maryland Handgun Laws Ruled Outside
Scope of Second Amendment"
. The Daily Record
January 5, 2011
. Danny Jacobs

Maryland's law restricting gun possession
outside the home without a permit does not
conflict with recent Supreme Court rulings
that the constitutional right to keep and bear
arms extends to individuals, Maryland's
highest court held Wednesday.
The Court of Appeals unanimously upheld
the 2008 conviction of Charles Francis
Williams Jr., who bought his handgun
legally but was arrested outside his home for
violating a state provision on carriage and
transport.
Williams
challenged
his
conviction based on District of Columbia v.
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago,
Supreme Court decisions from 2008 and last
year, respectively, that extended Second
Amendment rights to individuals and to the
states.
Judge Lynne A. Battaglia, writing for a
unanimous court, sided with the state, noting
other state courts have reached similar
conclusions in Cases involving their handgun
laws. The Maryland case is Charles F.
Williams Jr. v. State, No. 16, Sept. Term,
2010.
"It is the exception permitting home
possession . . . that takes the statutory
scheme embodied in Section 4-203 outside
of the scope of the Second Amendment, as
articulated in· Heller and McDonald,"
Battaglia wrote.

Attorney General Douglas F. Gansler, who
argued the case on behalf of the state, said
the issue before the Maryland court was
straightforward.

"The question was purely a legal one," he
said. "It was not that complicated of a case."
James B. Hopewell, Williams' lawyer, was
disappointed by the opinion.
"We believe the law strongly supported our
position," said Hopewell, a Riverdale solo
practitioner. "My client should not be
prosecuted and criminalized for something
that is not a crime."
Williams bought his handgun legally from a
licensed dealer in August 2007 but had not
applied for a permit, according to the
opinion. He had no prior criminal record,
Hopewell said.
Two months later, a Prince George's County
police officer saw Williams searching a
backpack near the woods, according to the
opinion. Williams told the officer he had
hidden his gun in the bushes, and he was
arrested for unlawful gun possession.
Williams was convicted in October 2008
and sentenced to three years in prison with
.all but one year suspended. His sentence had
been on hold while his appeals were being
heard, although Hopewell said Wednesday
he did not know when Williams would
begin serving time.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed
Williams' conviction in October 2009.
Battaglia dismissed Williams' claim that
McDonald extends Second Amendment
rights outside the home. Justice Samuel A.
Alito Jr. wrote for the Supreme Court that
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the Second Amendment protects "most
notably" self-defense within the home, a
point Hopewell seized on in oral arguments.

Gansler disagreed, but said he would not be
surprised if future cases before the Supreme
Court challenge local and state gun laws.

"Although Williams attempts to find succor
in this dicta, it is clear that prohibition of
firearms in the home was the gravamen of
the certiorari questions in both Heller and
McDonald and their answers," the judge
wrote. "If the Supreme Court, in this dicta,
meant its holding to extend beyond home
possession, it will need to say so more
plainly."

"I think there will be other cases coming
down the road regarding the scope of the
Second Amendment," he said.

Said Hopewell: "It sOrt of seemed they were
trying to kick this case up to the Supreme
Court."

Judge Joseph F. Murphy, in a concurring
opinion, Objected to Battaglia using the
.phrase "outside the scope of the Second
Amendment," writing that the Second
Amendment is "'satisfied' by a statute that
places reasonable restrictions on the
constitutional right to bear arms."

***
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"Highest Court of Maryland Holds That Second
Amendment Does Not Protect Carrying (Concealed
or Not) of Guns Outside the Home"
The Volokh Conspiracy
January 5, 2011
Eugene Volokh

Here's the opinion, handed down today, in
Williams v. State. The court interprets
Heller and McDonald as focused on home
possession of guns, arguing that "it is clear
that prohibition of firearms in the home was
the gravamen of the certiorari questions in
both Heller and McDonald and their
answers. If the Supreme Court, in this dicta,
meant its holding to extend beyond home
posseSSIOn, it will need to say so more
plainly."

suggested that carrying in public is
generally constitutionally protected,
though some courts have disagreed.

Heller stated that bans on concealed
carry of firearms are so traditionally
recognized that they must be seen as
constitutionally pelmissible ....

Such protection, of course, makes
sense when the right is (at least in
part) a right to keep and bear alms in
self-defense: Often, people need to
defend themselves against robbers,
rapists, and killers outside and not
just in the home. Two-thirds of all
rapes and sexual assaults, for
instance, happen outside the victim's
home, and half happen outside
anyone's home. The percentages are
even greater for robberies and
assaults~ So a ban on carrying
weapons outside the homeespecially in places that one
practically needs to frequent, such as
the streets on the way to work or to
buy groceries-is a serious burden
on the right, more so than the ban on
handgun possession struck down in
Heller (which would have at least
left open some possibility of selfdefense with shotguns or rifles).

The SaIne cannot, however, be said
about general bans on carrying
firearms in public, which prohibit
open as well as concealed carrying.
Heller expressly concluded that "the
right to . . . bear arms" referred to
carrying arms. . . . [M]any courts
applying state constitutional [right to
bear alms] provisions have held or

I should have also noted that Heller's
dictum
accepting-as
traditionally
recogmzmg
restrictions
on
Second
Amendment rights-"laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings"
strongly suggests that laws forbidding the
carrying of fire alms in other places do
implicate the Second Amendment.

I don't think this analysis is right. First,
Heller's reasoning-whic1;l, even to the
extent it goes outside the questions
presented in the cases, ought to be taken
seriously-strongly suggests that the Second
Amendment does apply to carrying guns in
public as well as to possessing in the home.
Here's an excerpt from my discussion of the
matter, in my Implementing the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms in Self-Defense article:
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Second, even if Heller is read as simply
holding that the Second Amendment
protects home possession of guns, this
simply means that whether the Second
Amendment protects gun carrying is an open
question. It seems to me that the court
should have given a reasoned answer to that
question; and it seems to me this court didn't
do that, other than by discussing some cases
from other jurisdictions, which also didn't
offer a reasoned answer to that question. In
our constitutional 'system, the definition of
the scope of constitutional rights is not left
simply to the Supreme Court. Lower courts
may and must consider arguments for
recognizing that a particular constitutional
right makes unconstitutional a particular

law, even if the Supreme Court has not yet
so held (un1es$ the Supreme Court has held
the contrary, which it certainly hasn't as to
this issue).
.
The defendant is arguing that the right to
"bear arms" includes carrying arms in
public. Heller at least makes clear that this IS
a plausible position, even if that question
was beyond the scope of the particular
challenge involved in that case. (See D. C. v.
Heller, starting with the text "At the time of
the founding, as now, to 'bear' meant to
'carry."') Why shouldn't this position be
accepted? The Maryland court decision does
not, it seems to me, offer an answer to that
question.
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Masciandaro v. United States
10-11212
Ruling Below: United Statesv. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
On June 5, 2008, Sean Masciandaro was found by a police officer sleeping in his vehicle which
was illegally parked on national park property. As the Masciandaro was presenting the officer
with his license and registration, the officer observed a machete-type knife under the driver's
seat. This prompted the officer to ask Masciandaro if there were any more weapons in the
vehicle. Masciandaro informed the officer a bag in the vehicle contained a loaded handgun for
which he had an expired Virginia concealed carry permit.
A magistrate judge found Masciandaro guilty on a charge of illegally carryirig a loaded handgun
in a motor vehicle on national parkproperty. The district court upheld Masciandaro's conviction,
rejecting his facial challenge to the applicable law on the basis of the Second Amendment and
declining to determine a level of scrutiny to apply to that challenge. The Fourth Circuit affirmed
and applied an intermediate level of scrutiny, holding that the government had shown the
regulation reasonably served a substantial interest in providing for the public safety in national
park areas.
Questions Presented: (1) Does the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution protect
a right to possess and carry a firearm for self-defense outside the home? (2) If there is a Second
Amendment right to possess and carry a firearm for self-defense outside the home, is it
constitutional to prohibit law-abiding citizens' possession and carrying of loaded weapons in
motor vehicles while on National Park Service land?
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Sean MASCIANDARO, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals for the FOUlth Circuit
Decided March 24,2011
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, writing for the
cOUlt except as to Part m.B:
Sean Masciandaro was convicted of carrying
or possessing a loaded handgun in a motor
vehicle within a national park area, in
violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b). He
challenges his conviction on two grounds:
(1) that he was improperly charged under §
2.4(b), because after he was arrested but

before he was tried, that regulation was
superseded by a more lenient regulation that
provided for state law to govern the legality
of his actions; or alternatively (2) that
section 2.4(b) violates the Second
Amendment as applied to him and facially.
Because we conclude that the holding in
United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 64
S.Ct. 359, 88 L.Ed. 290 (1944), as well as
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the general federal savings statute, 1 U.S.C.
§ 109, denies defendants an automatic
entitlement to the benefit of post-arrest
changes in the law, we find that
Masciandaro was properly tried under the
law as it existed on the date of his arrest.
On Masciandaro' s constitutional challenge,
we conclude that Masciandaro' s Second
Amendment. claim to a right to carry or
possess a loaded handgun for self-defense is
assessed under the intermediate scrutiny
,standard, and, even if his claim implicates
the Second Amendment, a question we do
not resolve here, it is defeated by applying
that standard. We conclude, that the
government has amply shown that the
regulation reasonably served its substantial
interest in public safety in the national park
area where Masciandaro was arrested. Thus,
we hold that. 36 C.F.R. § 2A(b) is
constitutional as applied to Masciandaro's
conduct.
Although Masciandaro has also mounted a
separate facial challenge to § 2.4(b), we
conClude that this challenge is foreclosed by
our determination that the regulation is
constitutional on an as-applied basis.
Accordingly, we affirm.
I

On June 5, 2008, at about 10:00 a.m., United
States Park Police Sergeant Ken Fornshill,
who was conducting a routine patrol of
Daingerfield Island, near Alexandria,
Virginia, observed a Toyota hatchback
parked illegally. The vehicle was parked
parallel to the side of the parking lot, in
violation of the sign indicating "Front End
Parking Only." As Sgt. Fornshill approached
the vehicle, he saw Masciandaro and his
girlfriend sleeping inside and awoke them

by tapping on the window. He asked
Masciandaro for his driver's license, which
Masciandaro produced from a messenger
bag located in the vehicle's rear
compartment. While Masciandaro· was
retrieving his license, Sgt. Fornshill noticed
a large "machete-type" knife protruding
from underneath the front seat, prompting
him to ask Masciandaro whether there were
any other weapons in the vehicle. When
Masciandaro replied that he had a loaded
handgun in the same bag, Sgt. Fornshill
placed Masciandaro under arrest. Following
a search, Fornshill uncovered a loaded 9mm
Kahr semiautomatic pistol, and at the police
station, Masciandaro produced an expired
Virginia concealed weapon carry permit.
Daingerfield Island, where Masciandaro was
arrested, is not an island but an outcropping
of land extending into the Potomac River
near Alexandria. The area, which is
managed by the National Park Service, is
used for recreational purposes and includes a
restaurant, marina, biking trail, wooded
areas, and other public facilities.
Masciandaro was charged with "carrying or
possessing a loaded weapon in a motor
vehicle" within national park areas, in
violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b), and failing
to comply with a traffic control device (the
parking sign), in violation of 36 C.F.R. §
4.12. These regulations were promulgated
by the Secretary of the Interior under 16
U.S.C. § 3, which authorizes the Secretary
to "make and publish such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary or
proper for the use and management of the
parks, monuments, and reservations under
the jurisdiction of the National Park
Service." Violations of these regulations are
punishable by a fine of not more than $500
or imprisonment not exceeding six months,
or both.
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At trial, Masciandaro explained that he
carried the handgun for self-defense, as he
frequently slept in his car while traveling on
business, and that while traveling, he often
kept cash, a laptop computer, and other
valuables on hand. The place where
Masciandaro was arrested on June 5, 2008,
was 20 miles from his residence in
Woodbridge, Virginia.
On April 30, 2008, slightly more than a
month before Masciandaro was arrested, the
Secretary of the Interior proposed a revision
to 36 C.F.R. § 2.4, which was designed to
harmonize the regulation of firearms in
national parks with that by the States. The
proposal advocated adding a new provision
to § 2.4 which would allow individuals to
possess loaded, operable firearms within
national parks whenever it was legal to do so
under the laws of the state in which the park .
was located, so long as the individual was
not otherwise prohibited from doing so by
federal law. On December 10, 2008-six
months after Masciandaro' s arrest but less
than two months before his trial-the
Secretary published a final version of the
regulation, to take effect January 9, 2009,
which provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision
in this Chapter, a person may
possess,
carry,
and
transport
concealed, loaded, and operable
firearms within a national park area
in accordance with the laws of the
state in which the national park area,
or that portion thereof, is located,
except as otherwise prohibited by
applicable Federal law.
73 Fed. Reg. 74,966, 74,971-72 (codified at
36 C.F.R. § 2.4(h)).
When 36 C.F.R. § 2.4 (h) took effect,
Masciandaro had not yet been tried, and he

promptly filed a motion with the magistrate
judge to dismiss the charges against him,
arguing that. § 2.4(h) had effectively
superseded § 2.4(b). He also argued that, in
any event, § 2.4(b) violated the Second
Amendment, as applied to him and facially.
The magistrate judge denied the motion to
dismiss, and, on February 3, 2009, found
Masciandaro guilty on both counts. The
judge imposed a $150 fine on the handgun
violation and a $50 fine on the· parking
violation. Masciandaro appealed only the
conviction on the handgun charge to the
district court.
On March 19, 2009, while Masciandaro' s
appeal to the district court was pending, the
District Court for the District of Columbia
issued a preliminary injunction, blocking
enforcement of newly promulgated § 2.4(h),
because the Department of the Interior had
failed to conduct the required environmental
impact analysis. Responding to this ruling,
Congress promptly added language to an
unrelated piece of legislation, which in
essence reinstated § 2.4(h) by statute.
Section 512 of the Credit CARD Act
provides:
The Secretary of the Interior shall
not promulgate or enforce any
an
regulation
that
prohibits
individual from possessing a firearm
including an assembled or functional
firearm in any unit of the National
Park System or the National Wildlife·
Refuge System if(1) the individual is not otherwise
prohibited by law from possessing
the firearm; and
(2) the possession of the firearm is in
compliance with the law of the State
in which the unit of the National
Park System or the National Wildlife
Refuge System is located.
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16 U.S.C. § 1a-7b(b).
On appeal, the district court rejected
Masciandaro's argument for application of §
2.4(h) in lieu of § 2.4(b) and affirmed the
magistratejudge's ruling. Relying mainly on
United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 64
S.Ct. 359, 88 L.Ed. 290 (1944), the court
.held that it was proper to try Masciandaro
under the law as it existed at the time of his
arrest. Addressing the constitutionality of §
2.4(b), the court did not decide what level of
scrutiny to apply but held that even applying
strict scrutiny, the provision was narrowly
tailored
to
serve
the
compelling
governmental interest in public safety and
thus was constitutional on an as-applied
basis. The court rejected Masciandaro's
facial challenge because he had not
"demonstrat[ed] from actual fact " that a
substantial number of instances exist in
which § 2.4(b) could not be applied
constitutionally.
From the jUdgment of the district court,
dated August 26, 2009, Masciandaro filed
this appeal.

II
[The Court upheld the lower court's
determination that Masciandaro
was
properly prosecuted under applicable law at
the time of his arrest, notwithstanding
subsequent legal developments postdating
his arrest.]

III
We
now
turn
to
Masciandaro' s
constitutional challenge to 36 C.F.R. §
2.4(b). Masciandaro contends that the
Second Amendment, as construed by the
Supreme COUli in its "watershed" decision
in Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008),

guaranteed to him the right to possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation and
thus protected him from prosecution under §
2.4(b) for exercising that right in a national
park area. He explains that
[H]e travels extensively because of
his small business and is frequently
forced to sleep in his car while he is
on the road. He has a Second
Amendment right to keep a loaded
handgun in the back of his car for the
purpose of self-defense and defense
of the valuable business property,
cash, and personal propeliy he
carries with him in the car.
Masciandaro points out that his handgun is
the "quintessential self-defense weapon" and
that he is exactly the type of "law-abiding
citizen" who· is the primary intended
beneficiary of the Second Amendment's
protections.
The government maintains that the holding
of Heller is inapplicable here. It argues:
In Heller, the Supreme Court held
that the District of Columbia law that
"totally
ban[ned]
handgun
possession in the home" and
prohibit[ed] rendering any lawful
firearm in the hou.se operable for the
purpose of immediate self-defense
violated the Second Amendment.
Because the Supreme COUli's
decision is limited to the possession
of firearms in the home, it does not
invalidate the regulation at issue,
which narrowly involves only the
possession of a loaded firearm in a
motor vehicle on National Park
Service land.
Both parties are correct, albeit incomplete,
in their descriptions of the holding in Heller,
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yet both disagree on the scope of the
constitutional right articulated there. Thus,
in resolving Masciandaro's constitutional
challenge, we will begin with a discussion of
Heller's holding and then proceed to
address, seriatim, the scope of the Second
Amendment right t6 keep and bear arms; the .
scrutiny· that is applied in determining
whether a regulation of firearms in national
parks is justified;' the question of whether a
national park is a "sensitive place" where
prohibiting firearms is a presumptively
lawful regulatory measure; and the
application of our
conclusions to
Masciandaro's circumstances.
A

The Second Amendment states, "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed. "
Resolving the longstanding issue whether
the Second Amendment guarantees an
individual right to keep and bear arms or a
collective right to do so in connection with
militia service, the Supreme Court in Heller
held, based on "the historical background of
the Second Amendment," that the
Amendment guarantees the "pre-existing"
"individual right to possess and ca11'y
weapons in case of confrontation." Heller,
128 S.Ct. at 2797 (emphasis omitted).
Because the right predated the Constitution,
the Court looked. to the historical record
when articulating its nature, noting that the
right was secured to individuals according to
"'libertarian political principles,' not as
members of a fighting force," to "protect[ ]
against both public and private violence." It
also observed that throughout the country's
history, Americans have valued the right not
only to be able to prevent the elimination of

militia, but "even more important[ly], for
self-defense and hunting."
Considering the constitutionality of a
District of Columbia statute that prohibited
private citizens from possessing handguns
and required other legal firearms, such as
long guns, to be stored in a fashion that
rendered them inoperable, the Court held
that the statute violated the .Second
Amendment, stating:
The handgun ban amounts to a
prohibition of an entire class of arms
that is overwhelmingly chosen by
American society for that lawful
purpose. The prohibition extends,
moreover, to the horne, where the
need for defense of self, family, and
property is most acute. Under any of·
the standards of scrutiny that we
have
applied
to
enumerated
constitutional rights, banning from
the horne the most prefe11'ed firearm
in the nation to keep and use for
protection of one's horne and family,
would fail constitutional muster.

***
We must also address the District's
requirement
(as
applied
to
respondent's handgun) that firearms
in the home be rendered and kept
. inoperable at all times. This makes it
impossible for citizens to use them
for the cote lawful purpose· of selfdefense
and
is
hence
unconstitutional.
Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18 (internal
quotation marks, footnote, and citation
omitted).

But in reaching its holding, the Court did not
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define the outer limits of the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. It
did point out, however, that the right was
"not unlimited, just as the First
Amendment's right of free speech was not."
Id at 2799; see also id at 2816 (noting that
. the right was not "a right to keep and carry
any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose").
Illustrating this point, the Court related that
a majority of the 19th-century courts that
considered prohibitions
on carrying
concealed weapons held them to be lawful
under the Second Amendment. It
summarized:
. Although we do not undertake an
exhaustive historical analysis today
of the full scope of the Second
Amendment, nothing in our opinion
should be taken to' cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding
the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws
imposing
conditions
and
qualifications on the commercial sale
of arms.
Id at 2816-17.

The Court explained in a footnote that it was
identifying these "presumptively lawful
regulatory measures only as examples."

scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights."
Two years after deciding Heller, the
Supreme Court revisited the Second
Amendment in McDonald v. City of
. Chicago, U.S. - - , 130 S.Ct. 3020,
177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), holding that the
Second Amendment was applicable to the
. States by incorporation into the Fourteenth
Amendment. Explaining Heller further, the
McDonald Court stated that "self-defense is
the central component" of the individual
right to keep and bear arms and that. this
right is "fundamental." McDonald also
reaffirmed that Second Amendment rights
are far from absolute, reiterating that Heller
had "assur[ed]" that many basic handgun
regulations were presumptively lawful. In a
similar vein, the McDonald Court noted that
the doctrine of "incorporation does not
imperil every law regulating firearms."
The upshot of these landmark decisions is
that there now exists a clearly-defined
fundamental right to possess firearms for
self-defense within the home. But a
considerable degree of uncertainty remains
as to the scope of that right beyond the home
. and the standards for determining whether
and how the right can be burdened by
governmental regulation.
NIEMEYER,
Circuit Judge,
separately on this Part m.B:

writing

B

Not only did the Heller Court not define the
outer limits of Second Amendment rights, it
also did not address the level of scrutiny that
should be applied to laws that burden those
rights. It found it unnecessary to do so
because the District of Columbia law under
consideration would violate the Second
Amendment "[u]nder any of the standards of

Invoking
Heller's
direct
holding,
Masciandaro argues that because he
regularly slept in his car, as much as three to
five days a week while traveling on
business, his arrest for carrying or
possessing a handgun ran afoul of Heller's
core protection of the right "to use arms in

112

defense of hearth and home." Alternatively,
he contends that if his car is found not to be
his home, his arrest nonetheless violated a
more general right to carry or possess a
handgun outside Of the home for selfdefense.
I would rej ect Masciandaro' s argument that
his car, even when he slept in it frequently,
was his "home" so as to fall within the core
protection articulated in Heller. In the
circumstances where Masciandaro had a
residence in Woodbridge, Virginia, which
was only 20 miles from where he was found
sleeping by Sgt. fornshill, and the place
where he was found sleeping was a public
parking place, we need not explore further
the factors essential to making a place· a
person's home for Heller's core protection. I
would conclude, in the circumstances of this
case, that Masciandaro' s car was not his
home.
Masciandaro also argues that he possessed a
constitutional right to possess a loaded
handgun for self-defense outside the home. I
would agree that there is a plavsible reading
of Heller that the Second Amendment
provides such a right, at least in some form.
The Heller Court began by noting that the
right predated the Constitution and always
was an important part of individual
. freedom-one of "the fundamental rights of
Englishmen." It found that the right included
the right to "protect[ ] [oneself] against both
public and private violence," thus extending
the right in some form t6 wherever a person
could become exposed to public or private
violence. Because "self-defense has to take
place wherever [a] person happens to be," it
follows that the right extends to public areas
beyond the home. MOl'eover, the right to
keep and bear arms was found to have been
understood to exist not only for self-defense,
but also for membership in a militia and for

hunting, neither of which is a home-bound
activity. Indeed, one aspect of the right, as
historically understood, was "to secure the
ideal of a citizen militia, which might be
necessary to oppose an oppressive military
force if the constitutional order broke
down."
Consistent with the historical understanding
of the right to keep and bear arms outside
. the home, the Heller Court's description of
its actual holding also implies that a broader
right exists. The Court stated that its holding
applies to the home, where the need "for
defense of self, family, and propeliy is most
acute," suggesting that some form of the
right applies where that need is not "most
Further,
when
the
Court·
acute."
acknowledged that the Second Amendment
right was not unlimited, it listed as examples
of regulations that were presumptively
lawful, those "laws forbidding the carrying
of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings." If the
Second Amendment right were confined to
self-defense in the home, the Court would
not have needed to express a reservation for
"sensitive places" outside of the home.
What the Heller Court describes as the
general preexisting right to keep and bear
arms for participation in militias, for selfdefense, and for hunting is thus not strictly
limited to the home environment but extends
in some form to wherever those activities or
needs occur, just as other Amendments
apply generally to protect other individual
freedoms. But I would not conclude that the
right is all-encompassing such that it extends
to all places 01' to all persons, as the
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized.
The complex question of where it may apply
outside the home, and what persons may
invoke it, is, however, not one that we need
to fully answer, because it appears
sufficiently clear that, in this case,
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Masciandaro's claim to self-defenseasserted by him as' a law-abiding citizen
sleeping in his automobile in a public
parking m-ea-does implicate the Second
Amendment, albeit subject to lawful
limitations. And any analysis of it, therefore,
requires review of the government's interest
in regulating firearms through 36 C.F.R. §
2.4(b) under the appropriate level . of
scrutiny, which we now address.
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, writing for the
court:
C
Masciandaro argues that § 2.4(b) should be
analYzed under strict scrutiny, because at the
time of his anest, he was a law-abiding
citizen who was simply seeking to exercise
his "fundamental" right to self-defense.
Without responding to Masciandaro' s
argument directly, the government asserts
that § 2.4(b) satisfies the strict scrutiny
standard, as it is narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling government interest in
public safety. In making this argument,
however, we do not understand the
government to be taking a specific position
on the level of scrutiny to apply.
In Heller, the Supreme Court expressly
avoided deciding what level of scrutiny
should be applied when reviewing a law
burdening the right to keep and bear arms,
because . it concluded that the District of
Columbia's
handgun
ban
under
consideration before it "would fail
constitutional muster" "[u]nder any of the
standards of scrutiny [traditionally] applied
to enumerated constitutional rights[.]" The
Court did, however, rule out a rational basis
review, because that level of review "would
be redundant with the separate constitutional
prohibitions on inational laws." Moreover,

by listing several "presumptively lawful
regulatory measures," the Court provided a
hint as to the types of governmental interests
that might be sufficient to withstand Second
Amendment challenges, as well as the
. contexts in which those interests could be
, successfully invoked.
We have held that intermediate scrutiny
should be applied when reviewing a Second
Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(9), which prohibits the possession of
firearms by a person convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
United States v, Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 677
(4th Cir.2010). In Chester, officers
sem-ching Chester's home in West Virginia
uncovered a 12-gauge shotgun and a 9mm
handgun, both of which Chester was
prohibited from possessing under §
922(g)(9) because he had a prior
misdemeanor conviction fo):, domestic
violence. In response to Chester's challenge,
we concluded that the scope of the Second
Amendment extended to Chester's activity
in possessing firearms in the home for selfdefense and that the burden on possession of
the firearms imposed by § 922(g)(9) was
subject to intermediate scrutiny. We
explained:
Although Chester asserts his right to
possess a firearm in his home for the
purpose of self-defense, we believe
his claim is not within the core right
identified in Heller-the right of a
law-abiding, responsible citizen to
possess and cany a weapon for selfdefense-by . virtue of Chester's
criminal history as a domestic
violence
misdemeanant.
Accordingly, we conclude that
intermediate scrutiny is more
appropriate than strict scrutiny for
Chester and similarly situated
persons.
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Id. at 682-83[.]
In the case before us, Masciandaro was a
law-abiding citizen at the time of his an'est,
without any· criminal record, whereas in
Chester, the defendant was a domestic
violence misdemeanant. On the other hand,
Chester was in his home, where the core
Heller right applies, whereas Masciandaro
was in a public park. These different
contexts might call for different judicial
approaches. Indeed, . as has been the
experience under the First Amendment, we
might expect that courts will employ
different types of scrutiny in assessing
burdens on Second Amendment rights,
depending on the character of the Second
Amendment question presented. Under such
an approach, we would take into account the
nature of a person's Second Amendment
interest, the extent to which those interests
are burdened by govemment regulation, and
of the
government's
the
strength
justifications for the regulation. As we stated
in Chester:
The Second Amendment is no more
susceptible to a one-size-fits-all
standard of review than any other
constitutional right. Gun-control
regulations· impose varying degrees
of burden on Second Amendment
rights, and individual assertions of
the right will come in many forms. A
severe burden on the core Second
Amendment right of armed selfdefense should require strong
justification. But less severe burdens
on the right, laws that merely
regulate rather than restrict, and laws
that do not implicate the central selfdefense concem of the Second
Amendment, may be more easily
justified.

Chester, 628 F.3d at 682 (quoting Skoien,
587 F.3d at 813-14).

As we observe that any law regulating the
content of speech is subject to strict scrutiny,
we assume that any law that would burden
the "fundamental," core right of self-defense
in the home by a law-abiding citizen would
be subject to strict scrutiny. But, as we move
outside the home, firearm rights have always
been more limited, because public safety
interests often outweigh individual interests
in self-defense. Since historical meaning
enjoys a privileged interpretative role in the
Second
Amendment
context,
this
longstanding out-of-the-home/in-the-home
distinction bears .directly· on the level of
scrutiny applicable. Indeed, one of the
principal cases relied upon in Heller upheld
a state concealed carry ban after applying
review of a decidedly less-than-strict nature.
Were we to require strict scrutiny in
circumstances such as those presented here,
we would likely foreclose an extraordinary
number of regulatory measures, thus
handcuffing lawmakers' ability to "prevent[
] armed mayhem" in public places, and
depriving them of "a variety of tools for
combating that problem[.]" While we find
the application of strict scrutiny important to
protect the core right of the self-defense of a
law-abiding citizen in his home ("where the
need for defense of self, family, and
property is most acute," we conclUde that a
lesser showing is necessary with respect to
laws that burden the right to keep and bear
alms outside of the home. Accordingly, we
hold that 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) will survive
Masciandaro's as-applied challenge if· it
satisfies intermediate scrutiny-i.e., if the
government can demonstrate that § 2.4(b) is
reasonably adapted to a ~ubstantial
governmental interest.
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D
Perhaps to avoid being required to carry any
burden to justify its firearms regulations in
national parks, which are properties owned
and inanaged by the government, the
government contends that 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b)
is a law regulating firearms in "sensitive
places," as identified in and therefore is
presumptively constitutiona1[.] Arguing that
Daingerfield Island is a sensitive place, the
government states that
a large number of people, including
children, congregate in National
Parks for recreational, educational
and expressive activities. Park land is
not akin to a gun owner's home and
is far more analogous to other public
spaces, such as schools, municipal
parks, governmental buildings, and
appurtenant parking lots, where
courts
have
found
firearms
restrictions to be presumptively
reasonable. Furthermore,' as the
. district court noted, the locations
within the National Parks where
motor vehicles travel are even more
sensitive, given that they. are
extensively regulated thoroughfares
frequented by large numbers of
strangers, including children.
It argues that in these circumstances, the law
is presumptively "narrowly tailored to
advance the
compelling
government
interest" in public safety.

Masciandaro
Daingerfield
place" like
building, as
argues:

contends that the parking lot at
Island was not a "sensitive
a school or governmental
referenced to in Heller. He

The George Washington Memorial
Parkway, where [he] was charged

with violation of the superseded
[National Park Service] weapons
regulation, is a public road and a
major traffic thoroughfare in the
Washington metropolitan area and is
not a sensitive place ....

***
There is a patchwork of regulations
that allow people to use and possess
weapons on NPS land, including
parkways and remote forests and
parks across the United States. Those
regulations reflect the [Department
of Interior's] determination that NPS
land is not sensitive, as a general
matter. Indeed, the very same NPS
regulation [36 C.F.R. § 2.4] that
prohibits possession of loaded
weapons in motor vehicles indicates
that it is lawful to hunt with
weapons, use them for target
practice, have them in residential
dwellings, use them for research
activities, and carry them for
protection in "pack trains" or on trail
rides, all on NPS land.

(Citing 73 Fed. Reg. 74,966, 74,971 (Dec.
10,2008)).
Masciandaro points out that the National
Park Service itself "has
explicitly
distinguished between the sorts of 'sensitive
places' mentioned in Heller (schools and
government buildings) on one hand and
national parks on the other" when it
explained that "nothing in [36 C.F.R. § 2.4]
shall be construed to authorize concealed
carry of firearms in any Federal facility or
Federal court facility as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 930."
These arguments raise the question whether
the "sensitive places" doctrine limits the
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scope of the Second Amendment or, instead,
alters the analysis for its application to such
places.
The Supreme Court in Heller did state twice
that the Second Amendment's right to bear
arms was "not unlimited." For example, it
stated:
Like most rights, the right secured
by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited. . . . Although we do not
take an exhaustive historical analysis
today of the full scope of the Second
Amendment, nothing in our opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on . . .
laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings.
Id. at 2816-17 (emphasis added).

Because of the relation between the first
statement and the examples, one might
conclude that a law prohibiting firearms in a
sensitive place would fall beyond the scope
of the Second Amendment and. therefore
would be subject to no further analysis. But
the Court added a footnote to its language,
calling
these
regulatory
measures
''presumptively lawful." The Court's use of
the word "presumptively" suggests that the
miiculation of sensitive places may not be a
limitation on the scope of the Second
Amendment, but rather on the analysis to be
conducted with respect to the burden on that
right.
The arguments of counsel about the meaning
of the "sensitive places" language raise
difficult questions about the scope of the
Second Amendment and the scrutiny to be
given to government regulations in sensitive
places. In Chester, we explained the
ambiguity inherent in these questions:

Having acknowledged that the scope
of the Second Amendment is subject
to historical limitations, the Court
cautioned that Heller should not be
read "to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions" such as ... "laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings." [Heller, 128
S.Ct.] at 2816-17. Heller described
its exemplary list of "longstanding
prohibitions" as "presumptively
lawful regulatory measures," id. at
2817 n. 26, without alluding to any
historical evidence that the right to
keep and bear arms did not extend to
... the conduct prohibited by any of
the listed gun regulations. It is
unclear to us whether Heller was
that
"longstanding
suggesting
prohibitions" such as these were
historically understood to be valid
limitations on the right to bear arms
or did not violate the Second
Amendment for some other reason.
Chester, 628 F.3d at 679.

In Marzzarella, the Third Circuit labored
over the same ambiguity:
We
reco gnize
the
phrase
"presumptively lawful" could have
different meanings under newly
enunciated Second Amendment
doctrine. On the one hand,· this
language could be read to suggest the
identified
restrictions
are
presumptively lawful because they
regulate conduct outside the scope of
the Second Amendment. On the
other hand, it may suggest the
restrictions are presumptively lawful
because they pass muster under any
standard of scrutiny.
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Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91.

We need not, however, resolve the
ambiguity in the "sensitive places" language
in this case, because even if Daingerfield
Island is not a sensitive place, as
Masciandaro argues, 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) still
passes constitutional muster under the
intermediate scrutiny standard.

.E
In reaching this result, we conclude first that
the government has a substantial interest in
providing for the safety of individuals who
visit and make use of the national parks,
including Daingerfield Island. Although the
government's interest need not be
"compelling" under intermediate scrutiny,
cases have sometimes .described the
government's interest in public safety in that
fashion. The government, after all, is
invested with "plenary power" to protect the
. public from danger on federal lands under
the Property Clause. As the district court
noted, Daingerfield Island is a national park
area where large numbers of people,
including
children,
congregate
for
recreation. Such circumstances justify
reasonable measures to secure public safety.
We also conclude that § 2.4(b)'s narrow
prohibition .is reasonably adapted to that
substantial governmental interest.· Under §
2.4(b), national parks patrons are prohibited
from possessing loaded firearms, and only
then within their motor vehicles. We have
no occasion in this case to address a
regulation of unloaded firearms. Loaded
firearms are surely more dangerous than
unloaded firearms, as they could fire
accidentally or be fired before a potential
victim has the opportunity to flee. The
Secretary could have reasonably concluded
that, when concealed within a motor vehicle,
a loaded weapon becomes even more
dangerous. In this respect, § 2.4(b) is·

analogous to the litany of state concealed
carry prohibitions specifically identified as
valid in Heller.
By permitting park patrons to carry
unloaded firearms within. their vehicles, §
2.4(b) leaves largely intact the right to
"possess and CruTY weapons in case of
confrontation." While it is true that the need
to load a fireruID impinges on the need for
armed self-defense, intermediate scrutiny
does not require that a regulation be the least
intrusive means of achieving the relevant
govennnent objective, or that there be no
burden whatsoever on the individual right in
question. Moreover, because the United
States Park Police patrol Daingerfield
Island, the Secretary could conclude that the
need for armed self-defense is les·s acute
there than in the context of one's home.
Accordingly,
we
hold. that,
on
Masciandaro's as-applied challenge under
the Second Amendment, § 2.4(b) satisfies
the intermediate scrutiny standard.

IV
In view of our determination that 36 C.F.R.
§ 2.4(b) is constitutional under the Second
Amendment as applied to Masciandaro, a
priori we reject his facial overbreath
challenge to § 2.4(b).
Without entertaining the novel notion that an
overbreath challenge could be recognized
"outside the limited context of the First
Amendment," we conclude that a person,
such as Masciandaro, to whom a statute was
constitutionally applied, "will not be heard
to challenge that statute on the ground that it
may
conceivably
be
applied
unconstitutionally to others, in other
situations not before the Court." This
conclusion "reflect[s] the conviction that
under our constitutional system courts are
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not roving commISSlOns assigned to. pass
judgment on the validity of the Nation's
laws." Accordingly, we reject his facial
challenge.
Because we conclude that 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b)
was properly applied to Masciandaro's
conduct and that § 2.4(b) is constitutional as
applied to the circumstances in this case, we
affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, with whom
DUFFY, Senior District Judge, Joms,
writing for the court as to Pmi IILB:
We are pleased to join Judge Niemeyer's
fine opinion with the exception of Part III.B.
In our view it is unnecessary to explore in
this case the question of whether and to what
extent the Second Amendment right
recognized in Heller applies outside the
home.
This case underscores the dilemma faced by
lower courts in the post-Heller world: how
far to push Heller beyond its undisputed
core holding. On the question of Heller's
applicability outside the home environment,
we think it prudent to await direction from
. the Court itself. See Williams v: State, 417
Md. 479, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (2011) ("If the
Supreme Court, in [McDonald's ] dicta,
meant its holding to extend ,beyond home
possession, it will need to say so more
plainly."); see also Sims v. United States,
963 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C.2008).
There mayor may not be a Second
Amendment right in some places beyond the
home, but we have no idea what those
places are, what the criteria for selecting
them should be, what sliding scales of
scrutiny might apply to them, or anyone of

a number of other questions. It is not clear in
what places public authorities rimy ban
firearms altogether without shouldering the
burdens of litigation. The notion that "selfdefense has to take place· wherever [a]
person happens to be," appears to us to
portend all sorts of litigation over schools,
airports, parks, public thoroughfares, and
various additional government facilities.
And even that may not address the place of
any right in a private facility where a public
officer effects an arrest. The whole matter
strikes us as a vast terra incognita that
courts should enter only upon ·necessity and
only then by small degree.
There is no such necessity here. We have no
reason to expound on where the Heller right
mayor may not apply outside the home
because, as Judge Niemeyer ably explains,
intermediate scrutiny of any burden on the
alleged right would plainly lead the cOUli to
uphold the National Park Service regulation.
The trend toward constitutional' avoidance
seems, finally, to be taking hold.
Ashwander, at long last, is back. See
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347~ 56
S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). The seminal case seems to be
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129
S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), which
cut back 9n Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)~
and relieved the circuit courts of the need
and burden of. deciding constitutional
questions in cases that could be resolved on
narrower grounds. Just as the qualified
. immunity inquiry in that case could assume
arguendo the violation of a constitutional
right, so too can the application of
intermediate scrutiny in this case assume
arguendo the existence of a right. Courts
take this approach routinely in \ harmless
error determinations as well.
Sometimes saying a little less, rather than a
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little more, is a nice way to discharge our
primary responsibility to the parties before
us of deciding their case. At other times, of
course, the need for clarity and guidance in
future cases is paramount, but in this
instance we believe the most respectful
course is to await that guidance from the
nation's highest court.
There simply is no need in this litigation to
break ground that our superiors have not
tread. To the degree that we push the right
beyond what the Supreme COUli in Heller
declared to be its origin, we circumscribe the
scope of popular goVernance, move the

action into court, and encpurage litigation in
contexts we cannot foresee. This is serious
business. We do not wish to be even
minutely responsible for some unspeakably
tragic act of mayhem because in the peace of
out judicial chambers we miscalculated as to
Second Amendment rights. It is not farfetched to think the Heller Court wished to
leave open the possibility that such a danger
would rise exponentially as one moved the
right from the home to the public square.
If ever there was an occasion for restraint,
this would seemto be it. There is much to be
said for a course of simple caution.
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"Cases Lining up to Ask Supreme Court to Clarify
Second Amendment Rights"
Washington Post
August 14,2011
Robert Barnes

A funny thing has happened in the three
years since gun-rights activists won their
biggest victory at the Supreme Court.
They've been on a losing streak in the lower
courts.
The activists found the holy grail in 2008
when the Supreme Court's 5 to 4 decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller said the
Second
Amendment
guaranteed
an
individual right to own a firearm
unconnected to military service. The court
followed it up with McDonald v. Chicago
two years later, holding that the amendment
applies not just to gun control laws passed
by Congress but to local and state laws as
well.
The decisions were seen as a green light to
challenge gun restrictions across the
country, and the lawsuits have corne raining
down-more than two a week, according to
the anti-gun Brady Center to Prevent Gun
Violence. But it is the Brady Center that is
crowing about the results.
"Three years and more than 400 legal
challenges later, courts-so far-have held
that the Supreme Court's ruling in Heller
was narrow and limited, and that the Second
Amendment does not interfere with the
peopie's right to enact legislation protecting
families and communities from gun
violence," the center said in a report
optimistically titled "Hollow Victory?"
Even those challenging gun restrictions
acknowledge that the courts have been
unwilling to expand upon the basic right that
most people agree Heller bestowed: the

. ability to keep a handgun in one's horne for
self-defense purposes.
The subsequent rulings "clearly highlight
the struggles lower courts are having after
receiving the Supreme Court's guidance in
Heller and ~McDonald," said Antigone
Peyton, an Alexandria lawyer. "They're
afraid to be out front on the law."
As Maryland's highest court, the Court of
Appeals, put it: "If the Supreme Court ...
meant its holding to extend beyond horne
possession, it will need to say so more
plainly."
If the court has more to say, two men from
opposite sides of the Potomac River are
hoping it will accept their cases in order to
do so.
In the Maryland case, Charles F. Williams
Jr. is challenging his 2008 conviction in
Prince George's County of violating the
state's prohibition on wearing, carrying or
transporting a firearm in public without a
permit. Williams had his legally acquired
gun in a bag as he traveled from his
girlfriend's horne to his own.
Williams acknowledges that he had not
applied for a permit. But his attorney,
Stephen. Halbrook, says that shouldn't
matter: the Maryland law is so restrictive
that it "basically says ordinary people can't
get one." He argues in his petition that the
law violates the Supreme Court's "analyses
and plain statements in Heller and
McDonald that the right to bear arms exists
outside the horne."
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Peyton represents Sean Masciandaro, a
reptile wrangler from Woodbridge, who was
convicted of violating a ban on having a
loaded firearm· in a vehicle on national
parkland. Mas ciandaro , who puts on
educational demonstrations as owner of
Raging Reptiles, said he was exhausted from
traveling when he pulled off George
Washington Memorial Parkway to take a
nap at Daingerfield Island near Reagan
National Airport.
A Park Police officer noticed him illegally
parked, woke Masciandaro and, seeing a
knife under his seat, asked if he had other
weapons. Masciandaro said there was a
loaded handgun in a bag in his trunk.
(Masciandaro said the gun was for
protection from people, not his animals,
which travel separately.)
Masciandaro was convicted and paid a fine
but argues in his petition to the court: "If
there is a Second Amendment right outside
the home, it surely applies to law-abiding
citizens carrying handguns for self-defense
while traveling on public highways."
He is appealing a decision of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, where
Masciandaro had the misfortune of pleading
his case before a panel that included Judge J.
Harvey Wilkinson III. Wilkinson is a
conservative stalwart, but has criticized the
Heller decision as an example of judicial
activism.
He was unequivocal that any expansion of
the right in Heller would have to come from
the Supreme Court.
"This is serious business," Wilkinson wrote.
"We do not wish to be even minutely
responsible for some unspeakably tragic act
of mayhem because in the peace of our
judicial chambers we miscalculated as to
Second Amendment rights."

It was clear from the beginning that much
litigation would be needed to define the
contours of Justice Antonin Scalia's
majority opinion in Heller.

In key parts, it is a half-empty, half-full
decision that allows both sides in the bitterly
contested fight over gun rights to indulge in
wishful thinking.
Gun-control advocates point to Scalia's.
instruction that "nothing in our opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on ... laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings."
But Halbrook, Williams's lawyer, says that
"obviously means that the right to bear arms
includes the carrying of firearms in nonsensitive places."
Although the Brady Center trumpets
Scalia's finding that there is no right to
"carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever
purpose,"
the
Second
Amendment
Foundation takes that as confirmation that
"there is a right to carry at least some
weapons, in some manner, for some
purpose."
The latter argument is in a brief supporting
Masciandaro's appeal written by Alan Gura,
who argued the Heller case. He said the case
provides a perfect chance to "clarify" for
recalcitrant lower courts that the Second
Amendment "applies beyond the threshold
of one's home."
But if neither Williams nor Masciandaro
strikes the court as the right opportunity for
the next round of Second Amendment
jurisprudence, Gura assures that there are
more cases on the way.
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